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A note on Carnap's meaning analysis

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Notes

  1. Rudolf Carnap, “Meaning and Synonymy in Natural Languages,”Philosophical Studies, 4:33–47 (1955).

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  2. Page 42. Carnap notes that this formulation is somewhat oversimplified. A time-variable should be introduced and some modification is required if the definition is to be adequate to the fact of vagueness. The problem with which I am concerned might be described as the problem of error and is to be distinguished from the problem of vagueness.

  3. In an earlier paper, I suggested this definition: “The intension of a word, say, ‘horse,’ for some person, might be said to comprise those characteristics which it is necessary for him to believe an object to have before he will refer to it as a ‘horse’ (or apply the word ‘horse’ to it).” See “Philosophers and Ordinary Language,” Philosophical Review, 60: 319 (1951) .

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  1. Brown University, USA

    Roderick M. Chisholm

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  1. Roderick M. Chisholm
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Chisholm, R.M. A note on Carnap's meaning analysis. Philos Stud 6, 87–89 (1955). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02341064

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