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On some worldly worries

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Abstract

Israel Scheffler and others have had trouble accepting such drastic theses in my work as that worlds, even old ones, are made by right versions, even new ones, and that two conflicting versions may both be right. But further explication shows how such theses have advantages over the more usual common-sense alternatives.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Harvard University, 208 Emerson Hall, 02138, Cambridge, MA, USA

    Nelson Goodman

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  1. Nelson Goodman
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Published by the author at Emerson Hall, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 02138, U.S.A., on 1 September 1988.

NOTICE: This paper may be copied and circulated with due credit but without charge. (It was accepted by theJournal of Philosophy, but withdrawn by that journal on the eve of publication because of a dispute over rights.)

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Goodman, N. On some worldly worries. Synthese 95, 9–12 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064664

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064664

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