Abstract
Searle's Chinese Room was supposed to prove that computers can't understand: the man in the room, following, like a computer, syntactical rules alone, though indistinguishable from a genuine Chinese speaker, doesn't understand a word. But such a room is impossible: the man won't be able to respond correctly to questions like ‘What is the time?’, even though such an ability is indispensable for a genuine Chinese speaker. Several ways to provide the room with the required ability are considered, and it is concluded that for each of these the room will have understanding. Hence, Searle's argument is invalid.
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Ben-Yami, H. A note on the Chinese Room. Synthese 95, 169–172 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064586
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064586