Conclusion
Contrary to what has been widely supposed, Bayesian theory deals successfully with the introduction of new theories that have never previously been entertained. The theory enables us to say what sorts of method should be used to assign probabilities to these new theories, and it allows that the probabilities of existing theories may be modified as a result.
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Maher, P. Probabilities for new theories. Philos Stud 77, 103–115 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00996314
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00996314