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The Popcorn Problem: Sobel on evidential decision theory and deliberation-probability dynamics

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Abstract

I defend evidential decision theory and the theory of deliberation-probability dynamics from a recent criticism advanced by Jordan Howard Sobel. I argue that his alleged counterexample to the theories, called the ‘Popcorn Problem’ is not a genuine counterexample.

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Eells, E. The Popcorn Problem: Sobel on evidential decision theory and deliberation-probability dynamics. Synthese 81, 9–20 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00869342

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