Abstract
I defend evidential decision theory and the theory of deliberation-probability dynamics from a recent criticism advanced by Jordan Howard Sobel. I argue that his alleged counterexample to the theories, called the ‘Popcorn Problem’ is not a genuine counterexample.
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Eells, E. The Popcorn Problem: Sobel on evidential decision theory and deliberation-probability dynamics. Synthese 81, 9–20 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00869342
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00869342