This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
References
Armstrong, D.: 1968,a Materialist Theory of Mind, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.
Block, N., and Fodor, J.: 1972, “What Psychological States Are Not’,Philosophical Review 81, 159–182.
Block, N.: 1978, ‘Troubles With Functionalism’, in C. Savage (ed.),Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume IX, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp. 261–325.
Fodor, J.: 1981, ‘The Mind-Body Problem,’Scientific American 224, 1, 114–123.
Dennett, D.: 1971, ‘Intentional Systems’,Journal of Philosophy 68, 87–106.
Horgan, T.: 1978, ‘The Case Against Events’,Philosophical Review 87, 28–47.
Horgan, T.: 1980, ‘Humean Causation and Kim's Theory of Events’,Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10, 663–679.
Horgan, T.: 1981, ‘Action Theory Without Actions’,Mind 90, 406–414.
Horgan, T.: 1981, ‘Token Physicalism, Supervenience, and the Generality of Physics’,Synthese 49, 395–413.
Horgan, T., ‘Functionalism, Qualia, and the Inverted Spectrum,’Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming.
Horgan, T., ‘Quinean Events,’ forthcoming.
Kim, J.: 1966, ‘On the Psycho-Physical Identity Theory’,American Philosophical Quarterly 3, 227–235.
Kim, J.: 1977, ‘Phenomenal Properties, Psychophysical Laws, and the Identity Theory’,The Monist 56, 178–192.
Kim, J.: 1973, ‘Causation, Nomic Subsumption, and the Concept of Event’,Journal of Philosophy 70, 217–236.
Kim, J.: 1976, ‘Events as Property Exemplifications’, in M. Brand and D. Walton, (eds.),Action Theory, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 159–177.
Kim, J.: 1979, ‘Supervenience, Identity, and Causality in the Mind-Body Problem’,Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4, 31–49.
Kripke, S.: 1974, ‘Naming and Necessity,’ in D. Davison and G. Harman (eds.),Semantics of Natural Languages. D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 253–355.
Lewis, D.: 1966, ‘An Argument for the Identity Theory’,Journal of Philosophy 63, 17–25. Reprinted with additions in D. Rosenthal (ed.),Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem, Prentice-Hall Englewood Cliffs, N. J., pp. 162–171.
Lewis, D.: 1972, ‘Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications’,Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50, 249–258.
Lewis, D.: 1980, ‘Mad Pain and Martian Pain,’ In N. Block (ed.),Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume One, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., pp. 216–222.
Putnam, H.: 1960, ‘Minds and Machines,’ in Sidney Hook (ed.),Dimensions of Mind, Collier Books, New York, pp. 130–164.
Putnam, H.: 1967, ‘The Mental Life of Some Machines,’ in H. Castanñeda (ed.),Intentionality, Minds and Perception, Wayne State University Press, Detroit, pp. 177–200.
Putnam, H.: 1967, ‘The Nature of Mental States’ (originally published under the title ‘Psychological Predicates’), in W. Capitan and D. Merrill (eds.),Art, Mind, and Religion, University of Pittsburg Press, Pittsburg, pp. 37–48. Reprinted in Rosenthal,Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem.
Quine, W. V.: 1970,Philosophy of Logic, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs.
Trenholme, Russell.: 1978, ‘Doing Without Events’,Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8, 172–185.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
I am grateful to Michael Tye for helpful comments and ch'schssion.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Horgan, T. Functionalism and token physicalism. Synthese 59, 321–338 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00869338
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00869338