Abstract
Hull's recent work in evolutionary epistemology is marred by a deep tension. While he maintains that conceptual and biological evolution are both driven by selection processes, he also claims that only the former is globally progressive. In this paper I formulate this tension and present four possible responses (including Hull's). I argue that Hull's position rests on the assumption that there is a goal which is sufficiently general to describe most scientific activity yet precise enough to guide research. Working from within Hull's framework, I argue that a non-progressionist stance is both preferable and more consistent with Hull's basic commitments.
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Grantham, T. Does science have a “global goal?”: A critique of hull's view of conceptual progress. Biol Philos 9, 85–97 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00849916
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00849916