Unbiased Bayes estimates and improper priors

Abstract

Given two random variables (X, Y) the condition of unbiasedness states that:E(X |Y=y)=y andE(Y |X=x)=x both almost surely (a.s.). If the prior onY is proper and has finite expectation or non-negative support, unbiasedness impliesX=Y a.s. This paper examines the implications of unbiasedness when the prior onY is improper. Since the improper case can be meaningfully analysed in a finitely additive framework, we revisit the whole issue of unbiasedness from this perspective. First we argue that a notion weaker than equality a.s., named coincidence, is more appropriate in a finitely additive setting. Next we discuss the meaning of unbiasedness from a Bayesian and fiducial perspective. We then show that unbiasedness and finite expectation ofY imply coincidence betweenX andY, while a weaker conclusion follows if the improper prior onY is only assumed to have positive support. We illustrate our approach throughout the paper by revisiting some examples discussed in the recent literature.