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Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control

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Abstract

Necessary and sufficient conditions for an alternative to be a sophisticated voting outcome under an amendment procedure are derived. The uncovered set, as first defined by Miller (1980), is shown to be potentially reducible, and conditions are determined for which this reduction equals the set of sophisticated voting outcomes. In addition, simple methods are given for calculating both the uncovered set and its reduction.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, 91125, Pasadena, CA, USA

    J. S. Banks

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  1. J. S. Banks
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Banks, J.S. Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control. Soc Choice Welfare 1, 295–306 (1985). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00649265

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00649265

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