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This paper is intended as a commentary on Quine's ‘Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes’. Quine's article was first published in 1956 and I have been thinking about it ever since. Quine has not been idle while I have been thinking, but his subsequent writings do not seem to have repudiated any part of ‘Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes’ which remains, to my mind, the best brief introduction to the field. The first half of my reflections was read to the Harvard Philosophy Colloquium in January 1966. Its writing was aided by conversations with Montgomery Furth. The present ending has been influenced by a number of different persons, most significantly by Saul Kripke and Charles Chastain. But they should not be held to blame for it. Furth, who also read the penultimate version, is responsible for any remaining deficiencies aside from Section IX about which he is skeptical. My research has been partially supported by N.S.F. Grant GP-7706.
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Kaplan, D. Quantifying in. Synthese 19, 178–214 (1968). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00568057
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00568057