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Justification in memory knowledge

  • Part IV: Knowledge, Justification, And Probability
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Abstract

The definition of memory knowledge that p put forward in this paper is nontraditional in that the justification for the belief that p which constitutes that knowledge is not located in any memory-impression or other present state of the subject. Rather it is the subject's actual past justification for p, or a proper part thereof, that justifies this present belief that p. It is argued (1) that the notion under definition is that of knowing straight from memory, (2) that an adequate definition here must take into account a difference, as to conflicting evidence one does not possess, between evidence one has forgotten and evidence one has never had, (3) that compared to Ginet's traditional definition (1975), the definition has several advantages, and (4) that the definition handles at least one type of situation where there can be memory knowledge that p without previous knowledge that p.

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Naylor, A. Justification in memory knowledge. Synthese 55, 269–286 (1983). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485072

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485072

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