Abstract
Traditionally, skeptics as well as their opponents have agreed that in order to know that p one must be able, by some preferred means, to rule out all the alternatives to p. Recently, however, some philosophers have attempted to avert skepticism not (merely) by weakening the preferred means but rather by articulating a subset of the alternatives to p — the so-called relevant alternatives — and insisting that knowledge that p requires only that we be able (by the preferred means) to rule out members of the set. In this paper I argue that a precise formulation of this new approach reveals it inadequate as a solution to skepticism.
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This essay has profited from comments by the referee and by the editor. I would like to express special thanks to Fred Dretske for his support of this project and for helpful discussions.
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Yourgrau, P. Knowledge and relevant alternatives. Synthese 55, 175–190 (1983). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485067
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485067