Abstract
An elementary proof of a theorem on two-person Nash implementable choice functions is provided.
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Jackson, M.O., Srivastava, S. On two-person Nash implementable choice functions. Soc Choice Welfare 9, 263–264 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00192882
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00192882