Conclusion
In previous essays (1973, 1975, 1977) I have praised Derrida's contributions to philosophical dialogue and also insisted on their limitations. The considerations raised in this present essay do not lead me to a position that is less ambivalent.
Philosophy is a particular language-game. Like any other, it has its constitutive rules; or, perhaps better: its practice has certain distinctive features by means of which we recognize philosophizing and distinguish it from other linguistic activities. None of this can be set down in the form of necessary and sufficient conditions, and there always will be large areas of controversy about the paradigms themselves. Nonetheless there are philosophers, and they generally acknowledge Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz, Hume, and even some of their colleagues as also being philosophers. This acknowledgement holds even where there is philosophical disagreement - as must inevitably be the case, in view of the dialogical character of philosophical discourse.
Derrida occasionally enters into the dialogue, as do many others - poets, novelists, critics, diplomats, attorneys, cooks, barbers, and babysitters. These occasional contributions to philosophical dialogue differ in focus, in style, and in lack of self-referentiality from the works which constitute the main corpus of philosophy. Some might wish to say, as if the matter were paradoxical, that such contributions are both philosophical and not philosophical, or that they are neither philosophy nor not-philosophy. That might be as good a thing to say as anything. The practice of philosophy is complex and has many levels. Those who are acknowledged as its finest practitioners have a focus, a style, and a respect for where questions begin and end. Derrida does not share these qualities, and does not care to share them. That is no reason to ignore his work, but it is sufficient to explain why philosophers do not recognize it as a contribution to the central corpus of philosophy.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Austin, J. L.: 1955/1975 How to Do Things with Words; The William James Lectures delivered at Harvard University in 1955. J.O. Urmson and Marina Sbisà (eds.), second edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Austin, J. L.: 1961, Philosophical Papers, J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock (eds.) Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Bubner, Rüdiger: 1974, ‘Zur Struktur eines tranzendentalen Argu-Ments” Kantstudien 65 Sonderheft, pp. 15–27. This Sonderheft is the same as G. Funke (ed.), Akten des 4 Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Mainz, 1974, de Gruyter, Berlin/New York.
Bubner, Rüdiger: 1975, ‘Kant, Transcendental Arguments, and the Problem of the Deduction’, Review of Metaphysics XXVIII, 453–467.
Bubner, Rüdiger: 1981, ‘L'autoréférence comme structure des arguments transcendantaux’, Les études philosophiques 4, 385–398.
Derrida, Jacques: 1967a, La voix et le phénomène, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris. Tr. David Allison, Speech and Phenomena, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, IL, 1973.
Derrida, Jacques: 1967b, De la grammatologie, Minuit, Paris.
Derrida, Jacques: 1967c, L'écriture et la différence, Le Seuil, Paris.
Derrida, Jacques: 1986, Parages, Galilée, Paris.
Derrida, Jacques: 1988, ‘The Politics of Friendship’, Journal of Philosophy LXXXV, 632–644.
Garver, Newton: 1965, ‘Varieties of Use and Mention’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research XXVI, 230–238.
Garver, Newton: 1967, ‘Analyticity and Grammar’, The Monist L, 397–425. Reprinted in L. W. Beck (ed.), Kant Studies Today, Open Court, La Salle, IL, pp. 245–273.
Garver, Newton: 1973, ‘Preface’, English translation of Derrida 1967a. Reprinted in John Canfield (ed.), The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, Vol. 15, Garland Press, New York, 1986.
Garver, Newton: 1975, ‘Grammar and Metaphysics’, in D. Ihde and R. M. Zaner (eds.), Selected Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, vol. 5, Nijhoff, The Hague.
Garver, Newton: 1977, ‘Derrida on Rousseau on Writing’, Journal of Philosophy LXXIV, 663–673.
Garver, Newton: 1990, ‘Wittgenstein and the Critical Tradition’, History of Philosophy Quarterly VII, 227–240.
Grice, Paul and Strawson, Peter F.: 1956, ‘In Defense of a Dogma’, Philosophical Review LXVI, 141–158. Reprinted in Paul Grice, Studies in the Ways of Words, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1989.
Hampshire, Stuart: 1989, Innocence and Experience, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Heidegger, Martin: 1962, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, tr. James S. Churchill, Indiana University Press, Bloomington/London.
Jacques, Francis: 1979, Dialogiques: Recherches logiques sur le dialogue, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris.
Kant, Immanuel: (KrV) Kritik der reinen Vernunft, in Kant, Werkausgabe, Bände III and IV.
Kant, Immanuel: (Fortschritte) ‘Über die von der königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin für das Jahr 1791 ausgesetzte Preisfrage: Welche sind die wirklichen Fortschritte, die die Metaphysik seit Leibnizens und Wolffs Zeiten in Deutschland gemacht hat?’, in Werkausgabe, Band VI. Page references are given both to this edition and also to the original edition by Rink (Königsberg, 1804).
Kant, Immanuel: 1968, Werkausgabe, 12 vol., Wilhelm Weischedel (ed.), Suhrkamp, Frankfurt.
Montaigne, Michel: 1962, Essais, two vol., Maurice Rat (ed.), Garnier, Paris.
Quine, Willard van drman: 1951, ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, Philosophical Review LXI. Reprinted in Quine, 1953, pp. 20–46.
Quine, Willard van Orman: 1953, From a Logical Point of View, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Rorty, Richard: 1989, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York.
Royce, Josiah: 1969, Basic Writings, two vol., John J. McDermott (ed.), University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Ryle, Gilbert: 1960, ‘Letters and Syllables in Plato’, Philosophical Review LXIX, 431–451. Reprinted in Ryle, 1971, Vol. I, pp. 54–71.
Ryle, Gilbert: 1971 Collected Papers, two vol., Hutchinson & Co., London.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig: (LW) Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Preliminary Studies for Part II of Philosophical Investigations, G. H. von Wright and Heikki Nyman (eds.), tr. C. G. Luckhardt and Maximilian A. E. Aue, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1982.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig: (OC) On Certainty, Blackwell, Oxford, 1969. References are to numbered sections.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig: (PI) Philosophical Investigations second edition, tr. G. E. M. Anscombe, Blackwell, Oxford, 1958. References are to numbered sections in Part I.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig: (RF) Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough, Rush Rhees (ed.), tr. A. C. Miles, Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1979.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig: (TLP) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, tr. David F. Pears/Brian McGuinness, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1961.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Garver, N. Derrida's language-games. Topoi 10, 187–198 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00141339
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00141339