Abstract
It is widely believed that empiricism, though once dominant, is now extinct. This turns out to be mistaken because of incorrect assumption about the initial dominance of logical empiricism and about the content and variety of logical empiricist views. In fact, prominent contemporary philosophers (Quine and Kuhn) who are thought to have demolished logical empiricism are shown to exhibit central views of the logical empiricists rather than having overthrown them.
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Creath, R. Are dinosaurs extinct?. Found Sci 1, 285–297 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00124614
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00124614