Zusammenfassung
Die individuellen Eigenschaften von außenpolitischen EntscheidungsträgerInnen spielen bei Prozessen der Kernwaffenverbreitung häufig eine wichtige Rolle. Trotzdem hat die theoretische Proliferationsforschung die Bedeutung des Individuums bislang wenig berücksichtigt. Eine Integration von individuellen Eigenschaften in die Analyse legt eine Änderung der abhängigen Variable vom Verhalten des Staates bezüglich einer Nuklearrüstung hin zu den Einstellungen der einzelnen EntscheidungsträgerInnen nahe. Dieser Schritt erhöht zwar geringfügig den Analyseaufwand, verspricht jedoch Vorteile für die Theoriebildung.
Abstract
In cases of nuclear proliferation and nuclear restraint, the individual characteristics of political leaders frequently play an important role. Yet, theories of nuclear proliferation have so far paid insufficient attention to the impact of individual decision-makers. Integrating individual factors into the analysis makes it advisable to change the dependent variable from the proliferation behavior of the state, to the individual attitudes of political leaders regarding proliferation. While this step slightly increases the amount of time needed to study nuclear proliferation, it is promising for the task of theory building.
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Notes
Kristof bezog diese Worte jedoch auf die Chance zu einem Neuanfang in der US-Politik gegenüber Nordkorea.
Der actor-observer-bias ist nicht zu verwechseln mit dem bekannteren „fundamentalen Attributionsfehler“ (Ross 1977). Der fundamentale Attributionsfehler meint die Vernachlässigung von Kontextzwängen bei der Deutung des Verhaltens der gegnerischen Seite – und zwar trotz des Wissens, dass bei diesem Kontext stets dasselbe Verhalten beobachtet wurde. Das Konzept des fundamentalen Attributionsfehlers macht aber (anders als der actor-observer-bias) keine Aussagen zur Erklärung des eigenen Verhaltens.
Waltz (1959) unterscheidet first image (Eigenschaften des Individuums), second image (die innere Struktur der Staaten) und third image (die Charakteristika des internationalen Systems) als Analyseebenen.
Theoretisch blieb allerdings die Option einer gemeinsamen „europäischen Bombe“ der EVG offen, die durch einen Konsens der EVG-Mitgliedstaaten zum Leben hätte erweckt werden können.
Dies berichtete US-Vizepräsident Humphrey dem westdeutschen Botschafter in Washington im April 1967. Vgl. Auswärtiges Amt (1967, S. 617).
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Die Forschung für diesen Beitrag wurde von der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft großzügig finanziell unterstützt. Der Autor dankt Sven-Erik Fikenscher, Joachim Krause, Oliver Meier, Christian Patz, Ingo Rohlfing, Oliver Thränert und den zwei anonymen GutachterInnen der Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik für wertvolle Kritik
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Schneider, J. Bringing the First Image of Nuclear Politics Back in: Plädoyer für eine verstärkte Einbeziehung des Individuums in die theoretische Analyse der Proliferation von Kernwaffen. Z Außen Sicherheitspolit 8, 69–89 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12399-014-0440-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12399-014-0440-x
Schlüsselwörter
- Individuum
- Nukleare Proliferation
- Politische Psychologie
- Außenpolitische Entscheidung
- Qualitative Methoden