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Justice, Human Rights, and Reconciliation in Postconflict Cambodia

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Abstract

Retribution? Restitution? Reconciliation? “Justice” comes in many forms as witnessed by the spike in war crimes tribunals, Truth & Reconciliation Commissions, hybrid tribunals and genocide trials. Which, if any form is appropriate should be influenced by the culture of the people affected. It took Cambodia over three decades to finally address the ghosts of its Khmer Rouge past with the creation of a hybrid Khmer Rouge Tribunal. But how meaningful is justice to the majority of survivors of the Khmer Rouge auto-genocide when only a handful of top officials are tried? Further, given the persistent abuse of political and economic rights in post-conflict Cambodia, we are skeptical that justice or reconciliation is presently possible.

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Notes

  1. See Kiernan (1996)

  2. Negotiations to set up the tribunal began on June 21, 1997 when the Cambodian government approached and requested the United Nations for assistance in this matter.

  3. We will hereafter refer to the E.C.C.C. as the Khmer Rouge Tribunal.

  4. For example, in the preface to An Introduction to the Khmer Rouge Trials (3rd edition), the Prime Minister of the Royal Government of Cambodia states, “When the judges have delivered their verdicts, we hope that Cambodians and all who support us will feel a load lifted from our backs as we finally bring justice in the name of the victims.”

  5. Ironically, although the party rejected everything “Western,” which they considered to be a contamination of the Khmer people and culture, many of the top leaders of the Khmer Rouge had been educated in the “West,” most notably in France. Pol Pot, whose real name was Solath Sar was a 49-year-old schoolteacher and the political leader of the Khmer Rouge. He had studied radioelectricity in Paris from 1949 to 1953. Khieu Samphan, the President of the State presidium of Democratic Kampuchea had also studied in Paris, where he had focused on Economics and Politics. His successful doctoral thesis, which he defended in 1959 titled “Cambodia’s Economy and Industrial Development,” advocated national self-reliance and generally sided with dependency theorists in blaming the wealthy, industrialized states for the poverty of the Third World. Samphan’s educational interests and leanings give us a sense of the utter frustration and resentment that most top Khmer Rouge officials had toward the West, blaming the West's exploitation of their nation as the cause of its “underdevelopment.” Therefore, the Khmer Rouge argued that the only route by which Cambodia could truly develop was by abandoning all western influences, and severing all ties with the west.

  6. The Khmer Rouge's rejection of everything “Western” was so extreme that a person who wore spectacles was considered to have been “corrupted by the West.” This was reason enough, according the Khmer Rouge to exterminate him or her. (van Schaack 1997)

  7. See Raszelenberg (1999)

  8. The Khmer Rouge continued to launch attacks from the western border of Cambodia with bases in Thailand and destabilize the countryside. The new government backed by Vietnam was called the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). After a peace agreement in 1996 brokered by the United Nations, Pol Pot formally dissolved the Khmer Rouge.

  9. For more background on the history of Cambodia, see Kurlantzick (2000).

  10. See The Khmer Rouge Tribunal, 33.

  11. Id.

  12. Human Rights Watch (January 2008) Cambodia: Country Summary. 4.

  13. See an interesting article on the Gacaca courts, IRIN, “Rwanda: Jury still out on effectiveness of ‘Gacaca’ Courts”, 23 June 2009.

  14. Ibid., p. 21.

  15. Ibid., p. 7.

  16. Ibid., p. 6.

  17. Ibid., p.6.

  18. Ibid., p. 7.

  19. Id. It should be noted that the E.C.C.C. report states that its budget “is around $60 million over three years.” An Introduction to the Khmer Rouge Trials, 2nd ed (2006). 18.

  20. See Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/.

  21. See, An Introduction to the Khmer Rouge Trials, 2nd ed (2006). 18.

  22. Id.

  23. See McCargo (2005, p. 104) and; See Khmer Institute for Democracy (2004) Survey on the Khmer Rouge Regime and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal 2004. Khmer Institute for Democracy, 12. According to the Khmer Institute for Democracy, these respondents came from ten different provinces across the nation, 32% of who had educational qualifications of high school and beyond—55% of who were male and the rest female. As far as occupations are concerned, 33.3% of the respondents were farmers, 1.9% were laborers, 12.2% were housewives, 12.2% were teachers, 13.4% were civil servants, 1.1% were members of the police force, 0.4% were members of the military police, 1.3% were enlisted in the army, 9.6% had their own businesses, 6.0% had other occupations such as monks, 7.5% of them were nongovernmental organization (NGO) workers, and 0.9% of them were students.

  24. Confidential interview with youth respondent, June 26, 2007, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

  25. The results of this survey give one the impression that there is overwhelming support for the Khmer Rouge Tribunal among the people of Cambodia today. However, it should be noted that this survey primarily interviewed persons who had survived the Khmer Rouge regime. Furthermore, the age range of the respondents varied from 30 years to 83 years, with the average age being 49 years, which tells us that this survey was not particularly targeted at the youth. In contrast, our 17 respondents are members of the “post Khmer Rouge generation,” 47% of whom were female, and 53% were male. Their ages ranged between 17 and 30 years of age, with the average age being 28.27 years. All of them had educational qualifications beyond middle school (23% were in high school at the time of this study, 54% were in university, and another 23% had completed their education and were working in NGOs. Therefore, 23% of them were employed by NGOs and 77% of the respondents were students).

  26. See, Human Rights Watch (2006), see also, Human Rights Center (2009).

  27. Confidential interview with a high ranking US Embassy official in Cambodia, June 19, 2007, US Embassy in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

  28. Since then, the E.C.C.C., has charged four other high-ranking Khmer Rouge members: Nuon Chea (former head of the Democratic Kampuchea National Assembly); Ieng Sary (former minister of foreign affairs of Democratic Kampuchea and Pol Pot's brother-in-law); Ieng Thirith (former minister of social affairs of Democratic Kampuchea); and Khieu Samphan (former head of state of Democratic Kampuchea; An Introduction to the Khmer Rouge Trials, 3d ed. 8 (2008).

  29. Pol Pot died in 1998, and Ta Mok, the regime's military commander and one of Pol Pot's most ruthless henchmen, died in July 2006 (“Key Khmer Rouge figures charged”, BBC News, December 11, 2007). This should provide members of the E.C.C.C. with a chilling comparison of the ICTY in Yugoslavia, and the E.C.C.C. should try to ensure that the persons that they want to prosecute do not die while under trial.

  30. See An Introduction to the Khmer Rouge Trials, 2nd ed (2006). 8.

  31. Id

  32. Khmer Institute for Democracy (2004, p. 12). Our respondents consisted of a focused survey group of 17 persons—members of the educated youth in Cambodia.

  33. Confidential interview with youth respondent, June 25, 2007, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

  34. The Documentation Center of Cambodia is a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization in Phnom Penh (in association with Yale University's Cambodian Genocide Program) that records and preserves the history of the Khmer Rouge and complied and organizes information that can serve as potential evidence in legally accounting for the crimes of the Khmer Rouge regime. (Eng 2003)

  35. In fact, in a recent (2009) population-based survey in Cambodia conducted by the Human Rights Center at the University of California, Berkeley, 20% of respondents indicated that social services such as health service, education, and psychological counseling should be provided to victims, while another 15% mentioned infrastructure, while 12% preferred economic measures, (Human Rights Center 2009, p. 44.)

  36. See for example, Human Rights Watch (2008b), and Amnesty International (2008a).

  37. United States Department of State, (Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, March 11, 2008) Cambodia: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2007. 1, (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100516.htm).

  38. Id

  39. http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&country=7365&year=2008, Freedom House describes a “not free” country as “one where basic political rights are absent, and basic civil liberties are widely and systematically denied”. See, Freedom House (2007).

  40. The UNDP human development index looks at three equally weighted variables: gross domestic product with purchasing power parity, literacy rates and life expectancy at birth. United Nations Development Program (2008).

  41. Id

  42. Transparency International, National Integrity Systems: Transparency International country Study Report—Cambodia 2006.

  43. United States Department of State (Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, March 11, 2008) Cambodia: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2007. 10, (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100516.htm).

  44. An Introduction to the Khmer Rouge Trials (2006). 2nd ed, 5.

  45. See for example, Human Rights Center (2009, pp. 36–37)

  46. Id

  47. Confidential interview with youth respondent, July 3, 2007, Battambang, Cambodia.

  48. See also, Human Rights Center (2009, p. 26)

  49. See Herman (1997).

  50. Id

  51. Confidential interviews with youth respondents, July 26 and 27, 2007, Phnom Penh, Cambodia; Confidential interviews with youth respondents, July 4 and 5, 2007, Battambang, Cambodia.

  52. See also, the UC Berkeley report, So We Will Never Forget, p. 29, Id.

  53. An Introduction to the Khmer Rouge Trials, 2d ed (2006). 19.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. The Ware Institute for Civic Engagement, Franklin & Marshall College, P.O. Box 3003, Lancaster, PA, 17604, USA

    Susan Dicklitch

  2. Department of Political Science, NorthWestern University, Scott Hall, 601 University Place, Evanston, IL, 60208, USA

    Aditi Malik

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Correspondence to Susan Dicklitch.

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Dicklitch, S., Malik, A. Justice, Human Rights, and Reconciliation in Postconflict Cambodia. Hum Rights Rev 11, 515–530 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-009-0153-z

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