Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Different Understandings of Life as an Opportunity to Enrich the Debate About Synthetic Biology

  • Critical Discussion Notes
  • Published:
NanoEthics Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Comments and reports on synthetic biology often focus on the idea that this field may lead to synthetic life or life forms. Such claims attract general attention because “life” is a basic concept that is understood, interpreted and explained in multiple ways. While these different understandings of life may influence the ethical assessment of synthetic biology by experts and the public, this field might, in turn, influence how academics or the public view life. We suggest in this paper that synthetic biology provides an opportunity to discuss and compare different views and explanations of the world, starting from the concept of life. We argue that a narrow focus on just one interpretation of this concept may be harmful and that people will benefit from being aware of a diversity of understandings of life because they provide answers to different questions. Moreover, the confrontation among views is important for the development of reasoning abilities, and a nuanced view on our world will be useful for integrating scientific findings and their implications into a wider context. At the same time, we should not only consider other understandings of life for our own benefit but also because a moral attitude of respect for and toleration toward others implies permission to express and maintain their views. For these reasons, we suggest that a diversity of views on life should be included in public education and in public engagement events on synthetic biology. Moreover, they should be on the research agenda of technology assessment studies within the ELSA or RRI frameworks.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. We do not refer to the discrepancy in different understandings of life, which have to do with the fact that some positions speak of life as the property, activity, or phenomenon that is shared by all living organisms whereas others speak of life in a biographical sense as the life-history of a self-conscious being. We are only concerned here with positions that speak of life in the first sense. A special issue of the journal Worldview 17 [16, 34] introduces a set of different understandings of life in that sense and discusses how they influence the assessment of synthetic biology.

  2. Exceptions to this general “agreement” include entities, such as viruses, erythrocytes, or spermatozoa, for which there are different opinions on whether they should count as “alive.”

  3. American authors often use the acronym Ethical Legal and Social Implications/Issues (ELSI) for the same type of research. Since the first ELSA/ELSI research program of the human genome program has been launched, many developments of emerging technologies, particularly in the life sciences, have been accompanied by ELSA research programs.

  4. In that sense, we support a point made by Philip Ball in an earlier article in this journal, namely, that we need to know more about different preconceptions and images of life and nature in order to be able to understand the public discourse on synthetic biology [2].

  5. Anthony Kronman made a similar point in the context of racial and ethnic diversity in education in the USA: ([28]:. 875)

  6. Stephen Darwall distinguishes between recognition respect, which is owed to all people and appraisal respect which is granted to appraise specific merits and of which thus not everybody is equally worthy [12]. In our context, we focus on recognition respect.

  7. Because we are discussing what it means to act respectfully of others in the context of different understandings of life, we focus on respect for autonomous persons. This is not to say that human beings who are no persons (such as young children) ought not to be respected, but respecting them does not imply warranting that they can maintain, express and propagate their specific views on and interpretations of life.

  8. When we speak of tolerating expressions of a proponent of a eugenic theory, this does not include political statements or discriminatory hate speech that directly violates human dignity of others. We exclusively speak of people who support eugenics as a scientific principle as it was supported by well-known scientists in the 1960s and 1970s, for instance some of the views expressed at the CIBA Symposium “Man and His Future” 1962 [43].

  9. Joanna Goven revealed that this important point has been disregarded in New Zealand’s Report of the Royal Commission on Genetic Modification. In this report, the commission identified worldviews as the sources of people’s values. They mention the traditional Maori worldview, the ecological worldview and the religious worldview but do not take into account that also the rest of society, including scientists themselves, are influenced by a specific worldview with its values [21].

References

  1. Attfield R (2012) Biocentrism and artificial life. Environ Values 21:83–94. doi:10.3197/096327112X13225063228069

    Article  Google Scholar 

  2. Ball P (2010) Making life: a comment on ‘Playing God in Frankenstein’s footsteps: synthetic biology and the meaning of life’ by Henk van den Belt (2009). Nanoethics 4:129–132. doi:10.1007/s11569-010-0091-x

    Article  Google Scholar 

  3. Biel A, Nilsson A (2005) Religious values and environmental concern: harmony and detachment. Soc Sci Q 86(1):178–191. doi:10.1111/j.0038-4941.2005.00297.x

    Article  Google Scholar 

  4. Bovenkerk B (2012) Biotechnology. An anatomy of the debate. In: Bovenkerk B (ed) The biotechnology debate. Democracy in the face of intractable disagreement. Springer, New York, pp 19–61

    Google Scholar 

  5. Buchanan A (2002) Social moral epistemology. Soc Philos Pol 19:126–152. doi:10.1017/S0265052502192065

    Article  Google Scholar 

  6. Caplan A (2010) The end of vitalism. Nature 465(7297):422–424. doi:10.1038/465422a

    Article  Google Scholar 

  7. Carr PA, Church GM (2009) Genome engineering. Nat Biotechnol 27(12):1151–1162. doi:10.1038/nbt.1590

    Article  Google Scholar 

  8. Cho MK, Magnus D, Caplan AL, McGee D (1999) Policy forum: genetics. Ethical considerations in synthesizing a minimal genome. Science 286(5447):2087, 2089–2090

    Article  Google Scholar 

  9. Cohen J (1993) Freedom of expression. Philos Public Aff 22(3):207–263

    Google Scholar 

  10. Collins J (2010) Got parts, need manual. Nature 465(7297):424. doi:10.1038/465422a

    Google Scholar 

  11. Comstock G (2010) Ethics and genetically modified foods. In: Gottwald F-T, Ingensiep HW, Meinhardt M (eds) Food ethics. Springer, New York, pp 49–66

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  12. Darwall SL (1977) Two kinds of respect. Ethics 88(1):36–49

    Article  Google Scholar 

  13. Davies S, McCallie E, Simonsson E, Lehr JL, Duensing S (2009) Discussing dialogue: perspectives on the value of science dialogue events that do not inform policy. Public Underst Sci 18(3):338–353. doi:10.1177/0963662507079760

    Article  Google Scholar 

  14. Deplazes-Zemp A (2012) The moral impact of synthesising living organisms: biocentric views on synthetic biology. Environ Values 21:63–82. doi:10.3197/096327112X13225063228023

    Article  Google Scholar 

  15. Deplazes-Zemp A (2012) The conception of life in synthetic biology. Sci Eng Ethics 18:757–774. doi:10.1007/s11948-011-9269-z

    Article  Google Scholar 

  16. Deplazes-Zemp A (2013) Introduction to special issue, synthetic biology and the notion of “producing life” in different cultures. Worldviews 17:1–9. doi:10.1163/15685357-01701001

    Article  Google Scholar 

  17. Deplazes-Zemp A, Biller-Andorno N (2012) Explaining life. Synthetic biology and non-scientific understandings of life. EMBO Rep 13(11):959–963. doi:10.1038/embor.2012.150

    Article  Google Scholar 

  18. Dürnberger C (2008) Der Mythos der Ursprünglichkeit – Landwirtschaftliche Idylle und ihre Rolle in der öffentlichen Wahrnehmung. Forum TTN 2008(19):45–52

    Google Scholar 

  19. Fiala A (2004) Toleration. In Fieser J, Dowden B (Eds). Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP): http://www.iep.utm.edu/tolerati/

  20. Gaskell G, Allum N, Stares S (2003) Europeans and Biotechnology in 2002, Eurobarometer 58.0, A report to the EC Directorate General for Research from the project ‘Life Sciences in European Society’ QLG7-CT-1999-00286

  21. Goven J (2006) Processes of inclusion, cultures of calculation, structures of power: scientific citizenship and the royal commission on genetic modification. Sci Technol Hum Values 31(5):565–598. doi:10.1177/0162243906289612

    Article  Google Scholar 

  22. Gregorowius D, Lindemann-Matthies P, Huppenbauer M (2012) Ethical discourse on the use of genetically modified crops: a review of academic publications in the fields of ecology and environmental ethics. J Agric Environ Ethics 25(3):265–293. doi:10.1007/s10806-011-9330-6

    Article  Google Scholar 

  23. Heyd D (1996) Introduction. In: Heyd D (ed) Toleration, an elusive virtue. Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 3–17

    Google Scholar 

  24. Huesken S (2014) Artificial life and ethics. Nanoethics 8:111–116. doi:10.1007/s11569-013-0186-2

    Article  Google Scholar 

  25. Katz E (1993) Artefacts and functions: a note on the value of nature. Environ Value 2(3):223–232. doi:10.3197/096327193776679909

    Article  Google Scholar 

  26. Koshland DE Jr (2002) Special essay. The seven pillars of life. Science 295(5563):2215–2216. doi:10.1126/science.1068489

    Article  Google Scholar 

  27. Krimsky S (2005) From Asilomar to industrial biotechnology: risks, reductionism and regulation. Sci Cult 18(5):309–323. doi:10.1080/09505430500368998

    Article  Google Scholar 

  28. Kronman AT (2000) Is diversity a value in American higher education. Fac Scholarsh Ser 52(5)

  29. Lammerts van Bueren ET, Struik PC (2005) Integrity and rights of plants: ethical notions in organic plant breeding and propagation. J Agric Environ Ethics 18(5):479–493. doi:10.1007/s10806-005-0903-0

    Article  Google Scholar 

  30. Madsen KH, Holm PB, Lassen J, Sandøe P (2002) Ranking genetically modified plants according to familiarity. J Agric Environ Ethics 15(3):267–278. doi:10.1023/A:1015729011895

    Article  Google Scholar 

  31. Mill JS (2008) On liberty. In: Gray J (ed) On liberty and other essays. Oxford World’s Classics, Oxford, pp 5–130

    Google Scholar 

  32. Owen R, Macnaghten P, Stilgoe J (2012) Responsible research and innovation: from science in society to science for society, with society. Sci Public Policy 39:751–760. doi:10.1093/scipol/scs093

    Article  Google Scholar 

  33. Powers M, Faden R (2006) Social Justice, the moral foundations of public health and health policy. New York Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  34. Rehmann-Sutter (2013) How do we see that something is living? Synthetic creatures and phenomenology of perception. Worldviews 17:10–25. doi:10.1163/15685357-01701002

    Article  Google Scholar 

  35. Sample I (2010) Craig Venter creates synthetic life form. http://www.guardian.co.uk, 20 May

  36. Scanlon T (1972) A theory of freedom of expression. Philos Public Aff 1(2):204–226

    Google Scholar 

  37. Siegrist M (1998) Belief in gene technology: the influence of environmental attitudes and gender. Personal Individ Differ 24(6):861–866. doi:10.1016/S0191-8869(98)00021-X

    Article  Google Scholar 

  38. Simpson ML (2006) Cell-free synthetic biology: a bottom-up approach to discovery by design. Mol Syst Biol 2:69. doi:10.1038/msb4100104

    Article  Google Scholar 

  39. Sjöberg L (2004) Principles of risk perception applied to gene technology. EMBO reports, 5 Spec No, S47-51, doi:10.1038/sj.embor.7400258

  40. The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (1978) The Belmont Report, Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research

  41. Torgersen H, Hampel JR (2012) Calling controversy: assessing synthetic biology’s conflict potential. Public Underst Sci 21(2):134–148. doi:10.1177/0963662510389266

    Article  Google Scholar 

  42. von Schomberg R (2013) A vision of responsible research and innovation. In: Owen R, Bessant J, Heintz M (eds) Responsible innovation: managing the responsible emergence of science and innovation in society. Wiley, London, pp 51–74

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  43. Wolstenholme G (1963) Man and his future. Little, Brown and Company, Boston

    Google Scholar 

  44. Wynne B (1993) Public uptake of science: a case for institutional reflexivity. Publ Underst Sci 2(321–337). doi: 10.1088/0963-6625/2/4/003.

  45. Zwart H, Landeweerd L, von Rooij A (2014) Adapt or perish? Assessing the recent shift in the European research funding arena from ‘ELSA’ to ‘RRI’. Life Sci Soc Policy 10(11):1–19. doi:10.1186/s40504-014-0011-x

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Sarah Chan, Joachim Boldt, Sune Holm, Markus Schmidt, and Donald Bruce for interesting discussions from which we have drawn for this article and Heather Bradshaw and two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on an earlier version of the manuscript. This publication is supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation as part of the NCCR Molecular Systems Engineering and by the European Commission’s Science in Society Programme of Framework Programme 7 as part of the SYBHEL project: Synthetic Biology for Human Health: Ethical and Legal Issues (SiS-2008-1.1.2.1-230401).

Conflict of Interest

Anna Deplazes-Zemp, Nikola Biller-Adorno, and Daniel Gregorowius declare that they have no conflict of interest.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute for Biomedical Ethics and History of Medicine, University of Zurich, Pestalozzistr. 24, 8032, Zürich, Switzerland

    Anna Deplazes-Zemp, Daniel Gregorowius & Nikola Biller-Andorno

Authors
  1. Anna Deplazes-Zemp
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Daniel Gregorowius
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  3. Nikola Biller-Andorno
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Anna Deplazes-Zemp.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Deplazes-Zemp, A., Gregorowius, D. & Biller-Andorno, N. Different Understandings of Life as an Opportunity to Enrich the Debate About Synthetic Biology. Nanoethics 9, 179–188 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11569-015-0226-1

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11569-015-0226-1

Keywords

Search

Navigation