Abstract
In a 2010 paper published in this journal, Robinson responded to Smilansky’s argument that compatibilists do not have a principled reason to reject prepunishment. Smilansky argues that, due to the nature of a compatibilist universe, offenders will actually carry out their intended offences and are rightfully held responsible for them. As a result, there is no moral demand to wait for the offence to occur before punishing the offender. Smilansky has responded to a number of objections, but has not addressed Robinson’s arguments. This paper will defend Smilansky’s position against Robinson’s claims and conclude that Smilansky’s position remains undefeated.
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Lam, V. On Smilansky’s Defense of Prepunishment: A Response to Robinson. Philosophia 44, 1367–1374 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9775-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9775-y