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Price-Cost Margins and Profit Rates in New Zealand Electricity Distribution Networks Since 1994: the Cost of Light Handed Regulation

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Abstract

From 1994 to 2003, New Zealand’s corporatized electricity lines networks operated with no industry regulator, but under the spotlight of mandatory information disclosure. As a result there exists a large body of detailed, audited and publicly available accounting data on the financial performance of these businesses. Using that data, this paper finds that price-cost margins have widened substantially since deregulation. We estimate the extent to which ‘‘light-handed regulation’’ has allowed profits to exceed the levels which would have been acceptable under the old rate-of-return regulatory framework, and find that the answer is about $200 million per year, on an ongoing basis.

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Correspondence to Geoff Bertram.

Additional information

We thank colleagues at Victoria University, and two anonymous referees for this journal, for constructive comments on this paper. Any remaining errors are entirely our responsibility.

JEL classification: D21; K23; L11; L43; L51

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Bertram, G., Twaddle, D. Price-Cost Margins and Profit Rates in New Zealand Electricity Distribution Networks Since 1994: the Cost of Light Handed Regulation. J Regul Econ 27, 281–308 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-005-6625-4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-005-6625-4

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