Public Choice

, Volume 145, Issue 3, pp 379–403

An auction market for journal articles

Open Access
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9571-3

Cite this article as:
Prüfer, J. & Zetland, D. Public Choice (2010) 145: 379. doi:10.1007/s11127-009-9571-3

Abstract

We recommend that an auction market replace the current system for submitting academic papers and show a strict Pareto-improvement in equilibrium. Besides the benefit of speed, this mechanism increases the average quality of articles and journals and rewards editors and referees for their effort. The “academic dollar” proceeds from papers sold at auction go to authors, editors and referees of cited articles. This nonpecuniary income indicates the academic impact of an article—facilitating decisions on tenure and promotion. This auction market does not require more work of editors.

Academic journals Academic productivity Market design 

JEL Classification

A11 D02 D44 
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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Economics, CentER & TILECTilburg UniversityTilburgThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Department of Agricultural & Resource EconomicsUniversity of CaliforniaBerkeleyUSA

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