- Jane Friedman
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In this paper I undertake an in-depth examination of an oft mentioned but rarely expounded upon state: suspended judgment. While traditional epistemology is sometimes characterized as presenting a “yes or no” picture of its central attitudes, in fact many of these epistemologists want to say that there is a third option: subjects can also suspend judgment. Discussions of suspension are mostly brief and have been less than clear on a number of issues, in particular whether this third option should be thought of as an attitude or not. In this paper I argue that suspended judgment is (or at least involves) a genuine attitude.
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- Suspended judgment
Volume 162, Issue 2 , pp 165-181
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- Doxastic attitudes
- Suspended judgment
- Withholding belief
- Jane Friedman (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. St Catherine’s College, University of Oxford, Oxford, OX1 3UJ, UK