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Transaction costs, opportunism, and governance: Contextual considerations and future research opportunities

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Abstract

Transaction cost theory (TCT) is one of the most dominant theoretical perspectives in contemporary business-to-business (B2B) research. Our article provides a brief review of this theory and identifies six important contextual considerations for future research. These considerations center on the topics of opportunism and governance and are intended to help refine and extend TCT’s theoretical, methodological, and substantive scope. In addition to exploring these particular ideas, we also encourage B2B scholars to contemplate ways of enriching TCT to meet the challenges posed by today’s rapidly shifting economic landscape.

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Correspondence to Aric Rindfleisch.

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Rindfleisch, A., Antia, K., Bercovitz, J. et al. Transaction costs, opportunism, and governance: Contextual considerations and future research opportunities. Mark Lett 21, 211–222 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11002-010-9104-3

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