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Ostensive Learnability as a Test Criterion for Theory-Neutral Observation Concepts

  • Special Section Article: Theory-Ladenness
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Abstract

In the first part of my paper I discuss eight arguments in favour of the theory-dependence of observation: (1) realistic content, (2) guidance function of theories, (3) perception as cognitive construction, (4) expectation-dependence of perception, (5) theory-dependence of scientific data, (6) continuity between observational and theoretical concepts, (7) language-dependence, and (8) meaning holism. I argue that although these arguments make correct points, they do not exclude the existence of observations that are weakly theory-neutral in the sense that they don’t depend on acquired background knowledge. In the second part I suggest an experimental method, the method of ostensive learning experiments, by which the degree of theory- and language-independence of a concept can be tested.

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Notes

  1. For arguments in this direction cf. Chalmers (1986, sec. 3.4); van Fraassen (1980, 56ff), Albert (1985, sec. II.8); Brewer and Lambert (2001, 182f.)

  2. That we don't regard the innate mechanisms of human vision as "theories" does not imply that we don't consider it as an important question to which extent these mechanisms construct an accurate image of the world. According to the findings of cognitive psychology, our visual image of the world that surrounds us is accurate in ordinary situations that were selectively relevant for our evolutionary ancestors to survive, but it may mislead us in situations that are exceptional from an evolutionary viewpoint.

  3. E.g., Putnam (1962), Shapere (1982), Kuipers (2000), Giere (1999), Adam (2004).

  4. An experiment of this sort has been performed by Hakan Beseoglu in Duesseldorf with students from high school and is not yet completed.

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Acknowledgement

Work on this paper was supported by the DFG-grant SCHU1566/3-2 of the research group FOR 600 at the University of Duesseldorf.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Heinrich Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, 40225, Düsseldorf, Germany

    Gerhard Schurz

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  1. Gerhard Schurz
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Schurz, G. Ostensive Learnability as a Test Criterion for Theory-Neutral Observation Concepts. J Gen Philos Sci 46, 139–153 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-015-9290-z

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