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Mental Realism Reloaded

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Notes

  1. According to the representational theory of consciousness (e.g. Dretske 1995; Crane 1998; Tye 2000; Byrne 2001), the mark of the mental is intentionality or representationality; according to the theory of phenomenal intentionality (e.g. Horgan and Tienson 2002; Pitt 2004; Farkas 2008), it is phenomenal consciousness.

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  1. Hungarian Academy of Sciences, TKI, Philosophy of Language Research Group, Budapest, Hungary

    János Tözsér

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  1. János Tözsér
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Correspondence to János Tözsér.

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Tözsér, J. Mental Realism Reloaded. J Gen Philos Sci 40, 337–340 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-009-9108-y

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-009-9108-y

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