Original Research


, Volume 74, Issue 2, pp 225-240

First online:

Temporal Parts and Time Travel

  • Nikk EffinghamAffiliated withDepartment of Philosophy, University of Birmingham Email author 

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This paper argues that, in light of certain scenarios involving time travel, Sider’s definition of ‘instantaneous temporal part’ cannot be accepted in conjunction with a semantic thesis that perdurantists often assume. I examine a rejoinder from Sider, as well as Thomson’s alternative definition of ‘instantaneous temporal part’, and show how neither helps. Given this, we should give up on the perdurantist semantic thesis. I end by recommending that, once we no longer accept such semantics, we should accept a new set of definitions, which are superior in certain respects to Sider’s original set.