Temporal Parts and Time Travel
- Nikk Effingham
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This paper argues that, in light of certain scenarios involving time travel, Sider’s definition of ‘instantaneous temporal part’ cannot be accepted in conjunction with a semantic thesis that perdurantists often assume. I examine a rejoinder from Sider, as well as Thomson’s alternative definition of ‘instantaneous temporal part’, and show how neither helps. Given this, we should give up on the perdurantist semantic thesis. I end by recommending that, once we no longer accept such semantics, we should accept a new set of definitions, which are superior in certain respects to Sider’s original set.
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- Temporal Parts and Time Travel
Volume 74, Issue 2 , pp 225-240
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- Nikk Effingham (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Philosophy, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK