Abstract
Recent large-scale cases involving multi-national corporations such as the BAE Systems and Siemens bribery scandals illustrate the difficulties faced by the UK and German sovereign states in controlling complex trans-national and multi-jurisdictional crimes. This article analyses the mixture of enforcement, self-regulatory and hybrid mechanisms that are emerging as part of UK and German responses to controlling transnational corporate bribery. This regulatory landscape incorporates a diverse array of direct and indirect state and non-state ‘regulatory’ actors of varying levels of formality. Mechanisms of a self-regulatory nature vary in terms of their mandatory/voluntary requirements and manufactured/organic formation. However, there is an assumption that the emergence of a variety of enforcement, self-regulatory and innovative hybrid mechanisms is sufficient but in reality this is not the case. Instead, the key argument of the article is that while these mechanisms are aiding the response, they are likely to fail leading to the default position of accommodation by state agencies, even where the will to enforce the law is high.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
See Transparency International’s discussion of ‘costs of corruption’: http://archive.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq#faqcorr4. Accessed 18 February 2013.
BBC: ‘Q & A: The NatWest Three’, 29/11/2007: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/5164652.stm. Accessed 18 February 2013.
BBC: ‘Extradition law review to consider US-UK treaty’, 8 September 2010: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11226673. Accessed 18 February 2013.
For example, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and the United Nations.
Specifically England and Wales, and Northern Ireland – Scotland not included as it constitutes a separate jurisdiction in relation to transnational corporate bribery.
Report available at: http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/pub/exporting_corruption_country_enforcement_of_the_oecd_anti_bribery_conventio . Accessed 18 February 2013.
‘Active enforcers’ refers to those countries with a share of world exports over 2% and with at least 10 major cases on a cumulative basis, at least three of which were initiated in the last 3 years and resulted in substantial sanctions. The category ‘active enforcer’ can also be given to those countries with less than 2% world export shares but these countries must have brought at least three major cases, at least one of which resulted in substantial sanctions and at least one case pending that was initiated in the last 3 years – these thresholds are arbitrary and are not premised on any logical foundation (it is unclear why the threshold is 10 major cases, for example).
For enforcement statistics see Transparency International’s progress reports on the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. See note 6 (above) for latest report.
Mabey and Johnson paid bribes in Jamaica, Ghana and Iraq and received a total financial penalty (including a criminal fine) of £6.6m. SFO press release: http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/press-release-archive/press-releases-2009/mabey--johnson-ltd-sentencing-.aspx. Accessed 18 February 2013.
Innospec paid bribes in Indonesia and were sanctioned to financial penalties and monitoring. See SFO press release: http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/press-release-archive/press-releases-2010/innospec-limited-prosecuted-for-corruption-by-the-sfo.aspx. Accessed 18 February 2013.
BAE Systems engaged in corruption in Tanzania and received criminal and civil financial penalties. See SFO press release: http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/press-release-archive/press-releases-2010/bae-fined-in-tanzania-defence-contract-case.aspx. Accessed 18 February 2013.
Full text of the Directive: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004L0018:En:HTML. Accessed 18 February 2013.
See Ministerial statement on the UKBA from Ken Clarke: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm110330/wmstext/110330m0001.htm#11033059000255. Accessed 18 February 2013.
See Article 5 of the Convention: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf. Accessed 18 February 2013.
SFO guidance on self-reporting: http://www.sfo.gov.uk/bribery--corruption/the-sfo%27s-response/self-reporting-corruption.aspx. Accessed 9 August 2012.
Financial Times: ‘SFO toughens stance on bribery’ 09/10/2012: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/996d051e-120d-11e2-bbfd-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2I9e4hnm9. Accessed 18 February 2013.
Financial Times ‘Rolls-Royce adds to SFO’s in-tray’ 06/12/2012: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f9f76a28-3fb7-11e2-b0ce-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2I9e4hnm9. Accessed 18 February 2013.
See paragraph 50 of Lord Justice Thomas’ sentencing remarks on Innospec: http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Judgments/sentencing-remarks-thomas-lj-innospec.pdf. Accessed 18 February 2013.
Financial Times: ‘“Plea bargaining uncertainty” hits SFO drive’ 07/08/2011: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c55f88e6-bf6f-11e0-898c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1WWTWzWSA. Accessed 18 February 2013.
SFO press release: http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/our-views/director%27s-speeches/speeches-2012/enforcing-the-law-on-fraud-and-corruption-does-self-reporting-pay.aspx. Accessed 9 August 2012.
SFO press release on OUP: http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-2012/oxford-publishing-ltd-to-pay-almost-19-million-as-settlement-after-admitting-unlawful-conduct-in-its-east-african-operations.aspx. Accessed 18 February 2013.
References
Abbott, K., & Snidal, D. (2006). The governance triangle: regulatory standards institutions and the shadow of the state. Working Paper, Global Governance Project. Oxford University
Abbott, K. & Snidal, D. (2013). Taking responsive regulation transnational: strategies for international organizations. Regulation and Governance, 7(1), 95–113.
Arrowsmith, S., Priess, H.-P., & Friton, P. (2009). Self-cleaning as a defence to exclusions for misconduct: an emerging concept in EC public procurement law? Public Procurement Law Review, 6, 257–282.
Ayres, I., & Braithwaite, J. (1992). Responsive regulation: Transcending the deregulation debate. New York: Oxford University Press.
Baldwin, R., & Cave, M. (1999). Understanding regulation. theory, strategy, and practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Black, J., & Baldwin, R. (2010). Really responsive risk-based regulation. Law & Policy, 32, 181–213.
Braithwaite, J. (2008). Regulatory capitalism: How it works, ideas for making it work better. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Braithwaite, J., & Drahos, P. (2000). Global business regulation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Djelic, M. -L., & Sahlin-Andersson, K. (2006). Transnational governance: Institutional dynamics of regulation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Delaney, P.X. (2007). Transnational corruption: regulation across borders. Virginia Journal of International Law, 47, 413–461.
Edwards, A., & Gill, P. (2002). Crime as enterprise? The case of “transnational organised crime”. Crime, Law & Social Change, 37, 203–223.
Edwards, A., & Hughes, G. (2005). Comparing the governance of safety in Europe: a geo-historical approach. Theoretical Criminology, 9, 345–363.
Edwards, A., & Levi, M. (2008). Researching the organisation of serious crimes. Criminology & Criminal Justice, 8, 363–388.
Elliot, L. (2009). Combating transnational environmental crime: “joined up” thinking about transnational networks. In K. Kangaspunta & I. H. Marshall (Eds.), Eco-crime and justice: Essays on environmental crime. Turin, Italy: Public Information Department UNICRI.
Garland, D. (1996). The limits of the sovereign state: strategies of crime control in contemporary society. British Journal of Criminology, 36, 445–471.
Garland, D. (2001). The culture of control: crime and social order in contemporary society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gibbs, C., McGarrell, E.F., & Axelrod, M. (2010). Transnational white-collar crime and risk: lessons from the global trade in electronic waste. Criminology & Public Policy, 9, 543–560.
Gill, P. (2002). Policing and regulation: what is the difference? Social & Legal Studies, 11, 523–546.
Gobert, J. (2011). Squaring the circle. The relationship between individual and organizational fault. In J. Gobert & A. -M. Pascal (Eds.), European developments in corporate criminal liability. London: Routledge.
Gobert, J., & Punch, M. (2003). Rethinking corporate crime. London: Butterworths.
Gunningham, N., & Grabosky, P. (1998). Smart regulation: Designing environmental policy. Oxford: Clarendon.
Hefendehl, R. (2001). Corporate criminal liability: model penal code section 2.07 and the development in western legal systems. Buffalo Criminal Law Review, 4, 283–300.
Khanna, V. S. (2004). Corporate crime legislation: a political economy analysis. Washington University Law Quarterly, 82, 95–141.
Lord, N. (2013). Responding to transnational corporate bribery using international frameworks for enforcement. Criminology and Criminal Justice. doi:10.1177/1748895812474662.
Mayntz, R. (1993). Governing failures and the problem of governability. In J. Kooiman (Ed.), Modern governance: New government-society interactions. London: Sage.
Ogus, A. I. (1994). Regulation: legal form and economic theory. Oxford: Clarendon.
Parker, C. (2002). The open corporation: self-regulation and corporate citizenship. Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.
Passas, N. (1999). Globalization, criminogenic asymmetries and economic crime. European Journal of Law Reform, 1, 399–423.
Punch, M. (2011). The organizational component in corporate crime. In J. Gobert & A. -M. Pascal (Eds.), European developments in corporate criminal liability. London: Routledge.
Rogall, K., & Pascal, A. -M. (2011). Country report: Germany. In J. Gobert (Ed.), European developments in corporate criminal liability. London: Routledge.
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1997). The political economy of corruption. In K. A. Elliot (Ed.), Corruption and the global economy. Washington: Institute for International Economics.
Rothe, D.L. (2010). Global e-waste trade: the need for formal regulation and accountability beyond the organization. Criminology & Public Policy, 9, 561–567.
Scott, C. (2001). Analysing regulatory space: fragmented resources and institutional design. Public Law, Summer, 329–353.
Silbey, S.S. (2011). The sociological citizen: pragmatic and relational regulation in law and organizations. Regulation and Governance, 5, 1–13.
Silbey, S.S., Huising, R., & Coslovsky, S. (2009). The sociological citizen: recognizing relational interdependence in law and organizations. L’Année Sociologique, 59, 201–229.
Sparrow, M. K. (2008). The character of harms. Operational challenges in control. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Teubner, G. (1998). Juridification: Concepts, aspects, limits, solutions. In R. Baldwin, C. Scott, & C. Hood (Eds.), A reader on regulation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wells, C. (2011). Containing corporate crime. Civil or criminal controls? In J. Gobert & A. -M. Pascal (Eds.), European developments in corporate criminal liability. London: Routledge.
Whyte, D. (2007). The crimes of neo-liberal rule in occupied Iraq. British Journal of Criminology, 47, 177–195.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Lord, N. Regulating transnational corporate bribery: Anti-bribery and corruption in the UK and Germany. Crime Law Soc Change 60, 127–145 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-013-9445-y
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-013-9445-y