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Interpreting the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear incident: some questions for corporate criminology

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Abstract

The serious nuclear incident at Fukushima Daiichi, triggered by the tsunami following the Tohuku earthquake on 11th March 2011, has prompted a flurry of investigations and debates of various kinds, within Japan and beyond. In common with many other such disasters, the causation of which brings together technologies, human behavior, organizational and regulatory cultures, and physical settings in complex configurations, serious questions have been asked about whether corporate crime was involved in creating this nuclear disaster. Of course the failure was prompted by an enormously powerful natural phenomenon, but should the operating company and government bodies have been better prepared? If so, who was to blame? Do attempts to explain the disaster in terms of cultural categories amount to a ‘cop out’; serving to excuse responsible individuals for acts both of commission and omission? In this paper, we examine these questions, focusing on the inherent ambiguity of such untoward events, and the difficult political and legal conundrums to which they can lead.

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Notes

  1. We are pleased to thank our email correspondent from Japan who kindly allowed us to use her words to introduce our paper.

  2. A plant manager had earlier refused company directions not to use the seawater.

  3. We have culled the material in this paragraph from a large number of internet sources, including the Japanese Prime minister’s quotations from the New York Times (3rd March 2012). Although we have not checked on the precision of all this material, we feel that it does convey something of the gist of the claims and accounts that circulated in the twelve months following the disaster.

  4. UNESCO [34] defined the precautionary principle as follows:

    “When human activities may lead to morally unacceptable harm that is scientifically plausible but uncertain, actions shall be taken to avoid or diminish that harm. Morally unacceptable harm refers to harm to humans or the environment that is

    • threatening to human life or health, or

    • serious and effectively irreversible, or

    • inequitable to present or future generations, or

    • imposed without adequate consideration of the human rights of those affected.

    The judgement of plausibility should be grounded in scientific analysis. Analysis should be ongoing so that chosen actions are subject to review. Uncertainty may apply to, but need not be limited to, causality or the bounds of the possible harm.”

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Cardiff University School of Social Sciences, Glamorgan Building, King Edward VII Avenue, Cardiff, CF10 3WT, Wales, UK

    Michael Levi & Tom Horlick-Jones

Authors
  1. Michael Levi
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  2. Tom Horlick-Jones
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Correspondence to Michael Levi.

Additional information

An earlier version of this paper is published in Japanese only in 2013, in Catastrophic Disaster and Crime, Ed. Toyoji Saito, Tokyo: Horitsu-Bunkasha (trs. Law and Culture).

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Levi, M., Horlick-Jones, T. Interpreting the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear incident: some questions for corporate criminology. Crime Law Soc Change 59, 487–500 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-013-9432-3

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