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Political exchange and the voting franchise: universal democracy as an emergent process

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Abstract

The expansion of democracy presents a puzzle for a rational choice theory of politics: why would those in power choose to dilute their power by expanding the voting franchise? In this article I introduce a new path of democratization, through mutually-beneficial political exchange aimed at securing collective-consumption goods. This political exchange path will produce a more constrained state than other paths to democracy, due to the subjective preferences of the two groups and the possibility of revoking the franchise. I briefly apply the democratization framework to the United State prior to the Civil War.

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Notes

  1. In the context of the US in the early nineteenth century, such works include Porter (1918); Williamson (1960); (Chute 1969); Keyssar (2000), and Wilentz (2005), though some of Keyssar’s analysis can be interpreted as a strong form of rational choice (see Johnson 2005).

  2. The applicability of this model has been challenged in the context of the US (Engerman and Sokoloff 2005) and Britain (Lizzeri and Persico 2004). Also, from a theoretical perspective, the costs of forcibly obtaining the franchise through revolution are often too high to serve as the driving force, due to either collective action problems or uncertainty about the outcome (Tullock 1971).

  3. Contrary to North and Weingast, in my framework extending the franchise is itself not necessarily a credible commitment, especially since numerous historical examples of revoking suffrage rights can be found.

  4. I am especially grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this formalization.

  5. The connection between wars and franchise expansions throughout US history has been noted by many authors, including Scarry (1991: 1304–1308); Porter (1994: 247), Keyssar (2000: xxi, 169–170), and Karlan (2003).

  6. Estimates of the percentage of adult white males that were eligible to vote around 1790 vary widely, but most range from just under 50% (Soltow 1984: 451) to around 75% (Main 1965). Williamson (1960: 38) and Bailyn (1969: 87) agree with the range of 50–75% of white males, though there is considerable variation across states and localities. See Lutz (1991: 23–24) for further discussion of these estimates.

  7. The journal of the convention in New Hampshire notes the change in wording of the suffrage clause, but provides no guidance on the rationale behind the change (Journal of the convention which revised the state constitution in 1791–1792, 1877: 95). The impact of political competition with Vermont is proposed by scholars ranging from Progressive Era historian Kirk Porter (1918: 23) to modern economic historians Engerman and Sokoloff (2005: 902).

  8. The requirement for white men 18–44 to perform militia service comes from two acts passed in 1792, collectively referred to as the Militia Act of 1792. The second of the two acts, the Calling Forth Act, established fines for not participating in the militia when called into the service of the United States. Fines were imposed, and although collection was often difficult, the aggregate amounts could be substantial. For instance, following the War of 1812, around 10,000 men were fined a total of nearly $500,000 at a time when the federal budget was around only $20 million (American State Papers: Military Affairs and 1832 : Military Affairs, Vol. 2 p. 316). On the compulsory nature of the militia system see Mahon (1960: 18–22, 47–48), Hummel (2001: 45–48, 56–57), and American State Papers: Military Affairs, Vol. 2 (315–319, 329–337, 389–395, 527–529).

  9. See the historians Williamson (1960: 108–109, 138–151); Kruman (1997: 91, 99–100); Pole (1958), and Keyssar (2000: 16–17) for discussion of Maryland, and McKinley (1905: 148–162); Steinfeld (1989: 339–340), and Williamson (1960: 151–157) on South Carolina.

  10. On Connecticut, see Kruman (1997: 16); Williamson (1960: 113, 182-190), and Wilentz (2005: 183–185). For New York, see Carter and Stone (1821: 181, 235); Porter (1918: 54-62), and Williamson (1960: 195–207).

  11. Peterson (1966: 11) and Hale and Hale (1853: 246, 249, 253).

  12. Pole (1966: 305-312); Williamson (1960: 226–227), and Keyssar (2000: 35–36). Petitions are on file at the Library of Virginia in Richmond, VA and are searchable online at http://www.lva.lib.va.us/whatwehave/gov/petitions/. For instance, in December 1815 there were petitions filed in at least seven counties which asked for “a Convention of the People to expand suffrage to all men who pay taxes or who serve in the militia.”

  13. Peterson (1966: 279–281); Pole (1966: 314–338); Williamson (1960: 231–234); Shade (1996: 62–70); Keyssar (2000: 35–37). A memorial from the non-freeholders of Richmond appears in full in proceedings (Proceedings and Debates of…Virginia 1830: 25–31), and others are mentioned as well (e.g., from Rockingham county, p. 32); for discussion of suffrage and the militia, see p. 123–124.

  14. The classic account of the Dorr War is Mowry (1901), while two studies from the 1970s, Gettleman (1973) and (Dennsion 1976), are also highly valuable though differing slightly in their interpretations of the episode. I draw on these and other sources, including Williamson (1960: 242–259); Keyssar (2000: 71–76); Wilentz (2005: 539–546), and Formisano (2008: 150–176).

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Acknowledgments

Financial support was provided by the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. I thank Richard E. Wagner, Peter Boettke, Rosemarie Zagarri, Jason Briggeman, Adam Martin, Christy Rhoton, Michael Thomas, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and discussion.

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  1. Harold Walter Siebens School of Business, Buena Vista University, Storm Lake, IA, 50588, USA

    Jeremy Horpedahl

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Horpedahl, J. Political exchange and the voting franchise: universal democracy as an emergent process. Const Polit Econ 22, 203–220 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-010-9103-7

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