Abstract
This paper delivers a step toward a naturalistic foundation of the social contract. While mainstream social contract theory is based on an original position model that is defined in an aprioristic way, we endogenize its key elements, i.e., develop them out of the individuals’ moral common sense. Therefore, the biological and social bases of moral intuitions are explored. In this context, a key adaptation during evolution was the one that enabled humans to understand conspecifics as intentional agents. Since these behavioral aspects are considered to be an exaptation, they are not amenable to direct genetic explanations or to rationality-based approaches.
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Notes
See, among many others, Witt (2003) for the approach of the Evolutionary Economics school as the most important contributor to this reorientation, and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Boyd and Richerson (1980), Cordes (2004), Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2003), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Güth and Yaari (1992), Vromen (2001) for similar approaches. See North (2005) for a related perspective on economic institutions.
Note that the latter may differ inter-individually, due to, for example, the heterogeneous distribution of power in the original position, as in, for instance, the approach by Buchanan (1975).
See Vickrey (1945, 328ff.) for a related argument.
See Harsanyi (1975, p. 595): “If anybody really acted this way he would soon end up in a mental institution.”
According to the Laplace rule, when no information whatsoever is available on how the probabilities for alternative consequences are distributed, a rational decision-maker should act on the assumption that all possible consequences have the same probability.
Italics omitted. Cf. also (Vanberg, 2004, italics omitted): “Contractarian constitutionalism...is about telling people what, in light of our theoretical constitutional knowledge, is prudent for them to do, in terms of their own interests and purposes.”
Or maybe we should understand the principle differently—as just banning a certain kind of restrictions, namely “external” or “arbitrary” or “artificial” ones? This question, though, is beyond the scope of the present paper.
Hume’s arguments against an empirical interpretation of the social contract metaphor does, then, miss its target [with the exception of Locke (1689/1988, §§ 100f.) and, at times, Buchanan]: in Hume (1748/1992) he observes that “[a]lmost all the governments, which exist at present, or of which these remains any record in story, have been founded originally, either on usurpation or conquest, or both, without any pretence of a fair consent, or voluntary subjection of the people.”
Cf. Hume (1748/1992).
In the words of Binmore (1994, p. 37, italics in the original): “The [traditional contractarian, C.C./C.S.] argument (based on a quasi-legal interpretation of the social contract) takes for granted that, because one would have wished to have made a commitment and perhaps therefore have uttered appropriate words or signed a piece of paper, therefore a commitment would have been made. But without a mechanism for making commitments stick, such gestures would be empty. For a person to have claimed, whether hypothetically or actually, that he is committed to a course of action is not the same as that person being committed to the course of action.” See also Harsanyi (1987, 343f., our italics): “[P]eople cannot rationally feel committed to keep any contract unless they have already accepted a moral code requiring them to keep contracts. Therefore, morality cannot depend on a social contract because...contracts obtain all their binding force from a prior commitment to morality.” See also Müller (2002, p. 479). Relatedly, Voigt (1999a, p. 287) argues that “[t]he existence of conventions is prerequisite for the ability to establish constitutions.”
Cf. Witt (1989).
The reason for this can be put as follows: “[A] proper coordination equilibrium [in the sense of a normatively expected behavior, C.C./C.S.] is a combination of strategies, one for each player, such that for every player i, if all the other players choose their equilibrium strategies, it is strictly best (i.e. payoff-maximizing) for every player that i chooses his equilibrium strategy too” (Sugden, 1998, p. 3, emphasis omitted).
In the words of Harsanyi (1955, p. 315), moral values may be thought to influence an individual’s “ethical preferences” (as opposed to his “subjective” preferences) that express “what he prefers only in those possibly rare moments when he forces a special impartial and impersonal attitude upon himself.” See also Harsanyi (1982, pp. 44–48) on “moral value judgments.” Vanberg’s (2004, p. 166, EN 5) concept of “constitutional interests,” as opposed to “action interests” is related to this.
As regards the relationship between empathy and sympathy, this paper’s notion differs from the one of modern rational choice theory: as will be shown in detail in the next section, the unique human capability to take another’s perspective and to understand his intentions forms the basis for empathy. However, this capability essentially also provides the cognitive foundations of sympathy: the ability to see the self in others allows for an understanding of others as sentient beings like the self, i.e., similar affective states are aroused on the part of the observer. Getting in touch with the emotions of other persons contributes to the motivating of human behavior.
Cf. Skyrms (1996, chap. 2) on some qualifications to this heroic assumption.
“An equilibrium of the natural game G [the ‘game of life’, C.C./C.S.] is said to be fair if its play would never give a player reason to appeal to the device of the original position under the rules of the morality game M” (Binmore, 1998, p. 11).
The following discussion draws on Cordes (2004).
In this context, intentional agents are defined as animate beings capable of controlling their spontaneous behavior, having goals, making active choices among behavioral means of attaining those goals, and choosing what they pay attention to in pursuing their goals.
It is known from research into autism that without a fully developed ability for joint attention, human beings fall into a grievous state of pathology. Moreover, autism is considered to be a disorder of biological origin (Baron-Cohen, 1990). The hypothesis is that in autism a specific impairment in the development of a “theory of mind” prevents sufferers from understanding and predicting much of behavior due to the fact that they cannot refer to mental states, such as intentions, emotions, believes, etc. (Bruner, 1995; Kasari & Sigman, 1995).
These cognitive achievements are followed by the acquisition of linguistic communication skills (Carpenter et al., 1998, p. 116). By learning and using linguistic symbols in a productive manner, children are demonstrating their understanding that other persons have points of view about a situation that may differ from their own (Bates, 1990; Searle, 1983, p. vii).
Nonhuman primates do not show these kinds of social-cognitive skills. Their forms of social learning and cognition do not require a comprehension of others as intentional agents.
Given the general developmental synchrony with which these cognitive capabilities emerge in ontogeny, it seems highly implausible that these behaviors are conditioned one at a time, each under an own set of reinforcement contingencies.
Considering the origins of the human capacity for culture, a period of co-evolution of cultural and natural evolution can be discerned. This phase of a mutually interactive relationship ultimately allowed forms of human behavior to emerge that had a strong relative reproductive success and resulted in an ending of natural selection as a shaping force. Behavioral variety of man increased notwithstanding adaptive value in terms of genetic fitness (Boyd & Richerson, 1980; Witt, 2003)
Sociobiology, applied to such organisms as, for example, social insects, can explain the evolution of behaviors. However, socio-biological arguments applied to explain all facets of social behavior in higher mammals face severe problems (see, also for references, Maryanski, 1994).
Moreover, Binmore (1998, 413ff.) assumes that, with respect to transactions with strangers, the hardwired fairness algorithm has been modified by cultural evolution to be also applied to these cases. He maintains that humans learned to adopt strangers into the family clan by treating them as relatives.
For further references for this strand of thinking see Chipman (2001).
Though, also the concept of “exaptation” has its origins in the writings of Darwin.
Other authors use the term “pre-adaptation” for the same phenomenon (see, e.g., Corning, 2003).
Adaptations that had been converted to an exaptation of different effect set the basis for a subsequent adaptation. Any coopted structure does not necessarily arise perfected for its new effect. Complex biological features can evolve by a mixture of exaptations and adaptations.
The breaking up of direct genetic mechanisms prevents a priori mathematical models from being applied as stylized descriptions of social evolution (see, e.g., Sugden, 2001).
Psychologists use the label “perspective taking” for the phenomenon of empathy.
Matsumoto, Haan, Yabrove, Theodorou, and Cooke Carney (1986) have shown that young children are capable of a wide range of morally sensitive behaviors in prisoner’s dilemma situations.
The motivational underpinnings of, for example, human helping behavior, namely a merged identity with the victim, general negative affect, and true altruism, i.e., empathetic concern, are all based on the human cognitive capacity to take the perspective of others (see, e.g., Batson, 1991; Brown et al., 2002; Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996). Though, empathy tends to be biased. Subjects are more empathic to persons who are familiar and similar to themselves than to persons who are different.
The subjects of a study conducted by Ames and Marwell (1981), for instance, have shown a surprising unanimity of thought regarding what was considered a fair contribution to a public good. Experiments on fairness in social psychology have led to an empirically based behavioral rule that resolves problems of social exchange by equalizing the ratio of each agent’s allotment to his worth. People who are considered to be worthy get more than others. Normally, this theory is called “modern equity theory” (see, e.g., Mellers, 1982). A prerequisite for such behavior is the capability to imagine oneself in the shoes of others, i.e., to see things from their point of view. Then it may be acceptable that those who invested more effort in a common affair are rewarded by receiving a correspondingly higher share of the benefits.
Adam Smith (1759/1982) argued for a “natural desire to please” as a fundamental characteristic of humans.
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Acknowledgements
We would like to thank participants at the workshop on “Evolutionary Concepts in Economics and Biology”, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, 2004, the 17th Annual Conference of the EAEPE, 2005, in Bremen, and the 2005 Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, New Orleans, for their helpful comments.
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Cordes, C., Schubert, C. Toward a naturalistic foundation of the social contract. Constit Polit Econ 18, 35–62 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-006-9011-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-006-9011-z