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Hint, Extortion, and Guessing Games in the Best Choice Problem

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Cybernetics and Systems Analysis Aims and scope

Abstract

The best choice problem (also known as “the secretary problem”) is one of the classical in stochastic optimization. In this paper, we consider a modification of the classical secretary problem by adding the second player, who can either help the first player to find the best element by a hint or precludes him by imposing some restrictions on the search. Nash equilibrium has been found in the explicit form of mixed strategies for three different types of the game. The asymptotic behavior of diverse numerical quantities associated with the optimal strategies for both players, as the number of objects tends to infinity, has been studied.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Kyiv, Ukraine

    S. I. Dotsenko & A. V. Marynych

Authors
  1. S. I. Dotsenko
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  2. A. V. Marynych
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to S. I. Dotsenko.

Additional information

Translated from Kibernetika i Sistemnyi Analiz, No. 3, May–June, 2014, pp. 107–115.

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Dotsenko, S.I., Marynych, A.V. Hint, Extortion, and Guessing Games in the Best Choice Problem. Cybern Syst Anal 50, 419–425 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10559-014-9630-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10559-014-9630-8

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