Why don’t foreign firms cooperate in US antidumping investigations? An empirical analysis
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- Moore, M.O. & Fox, A.K. Rev World Econ (2010) 145: 597. doi:10.1007/s10290-009-0035-0
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Foreign firms face punitive duties if they do not cooperate with the US Department of Commerce (DOC) in antidumping procedures. For example, 37% of all foreign firms involved in antidumping investigations in the US faced “facts available” margins for the 1995–2002 period, with average antidumping duties of 31% for cooperating foreign firms, compared to 87% for those who did not cooperate. The existing literature has focused on how DOC discretion has led to foreign firm non-cooperation. This paper instead examines individual foreign firm’s decisions about whether to cooperate during this same period. We find evidence that non-cooperation is consistent with a model of foreign firms rationally choosing not to cooperate, rather than solely as a result of investigating authority bias against imports.