Abstract
We present a model of a fiscal constitution (i.e., a transfer scheme between income classes) that is self-enforcing against a background in which predatory activities (‘revolutions’) are feasible. In this environment, a constitution self-enforces by structuring society’s interests in such a way that non- compliance necessarily results in a revolution which society would rather avoid.
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Filipovich, D., Sempere, J. Constitutions as self-enforcing redistributive schemes. Economics of Governance 9, 103–129 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-006-0027-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-006-0027-7