Abstract
Since merger and acquisition activity does not unambiguously benefit the shareholders of acquiring firms, the motivation of managers who undertake such actions is unclear. The present study investigates the extent to which the wealth effects of acquisition activity undertaken by firms in one industry—communications and publishing—are related to (1) the ownership and wealth characteristics of both the executives and the board of directors of these firms and (2) the ownership concentration of large outside shareholders. The motivating hypothesis, supported by empirical results, is that these factors contribute to the alignment of executive and shareholder interests.
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Shinn, E.W. Returns to acquiring firms: The role of managerial ownership, managerial wealth, and outside owners. J Econ Finan 23, 78–89 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02752689
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02752689