Abstract
Most existing models of spatial agglomeration economics do not include the effects of the governmental sector in an urban configuration, although the governmental sector plays an important role in economic activity. We discuss how an exogenous distribution of locations of governmental facilities and the level of service provided affect the equilibrium urban configuration under the assumption that governmental service is necessary component for production of goods by a firm. The model yields multiple equilibrium urban configurations endogenously, depending on the set of parameters, and that the governmental sector is responsible for the movement of equilibrium market land rents stemming from its determination of location.
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Comments and suggestions by anonymous referees are gratefully acknowledged. A preliminary draft of this paper was presented at The Second Summer Institute of the Pacific Regional Science Organization, held on July 20–23, 1992, in Taipei, Taiwan, R.O.C. I thank to M. Fujita and H. Koide for helpful comments and suggestions.
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Peng, SK. The location of governmental facilities and equilibrium urban configuration. Ann Reg Sci 30, 247–272 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01580521
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01580521