Abstract
When analyzing what to do with a currently defaulted loan, the lender must consider the impact of his foreclosure versus workout decision on the expected payoff of subsequent loans as well as on the payoff of the current loan. This is because borrowers with future loan payoff dates can observe the lender's actions and update prior information regarding the lender's toughness or wimpiness when dealing with defaulted loans. In this paper we consider the strategic interaction between a lender and multiple borrowers, where borrowers have distinct, sequentially maturing mortgage loans and where the lender has private information regarding the magnitude of his foreclosure costs. We find that a variety of strategic outcomes can occur that explain the co-existence of workout and foreclosure in the mortgage marketplace. In general, the lender's workout/foreclosure response depends on the cost of bluffing (e.g., foreclosing when workout is cheaper) versus the value of reducing expected defaults and workout concession losses on future loans (e.g., imperfect foreclosure cost information leads future borrowers to payoff the mortgage when default would have been optimal under perfect information). Given recently revised expectations regarding the depth of the real estate recession, our results may explain the move by many lenders away from granting workout concessions and toward taking a harder line when dealing with defaulting borrowers.
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Riddiough, T.J., Wyatt, S.B. Wimp or tough guy: Sequential default risk and signaling with mortgages. J Real Estate Finan Econ 9, 299–321 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01099281
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01099281