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Interest groups and the regulation of pesticides: Congress, coalitions, and closure

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Abstract

This article is essentially a rejoinder to Christopher Bosso's piece, ‘Transforming Adversaries Into Collaborators: Interest groups and the regulation of chemical pesticides,’ which appeared in this journal (21: 3–22). The case of pesticides regulation is re-examined and some new insights are offered. At the center of Bosso's argument is the contention that Congress is passive. John Kingdon's agenda/alternative distinction is utilized to arrive at an alternative way to think about the role of Congress in today's ‘permeable pressure system.’

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, 504 Blake Hall University of Kansas, 66045, Lawrence, Kansas, U.S.A.

    Anthony J. Nownes

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  1. Anthony J. Nownes
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Nownes, A.J. Interest groups and the regulation of pesticides: Congress, coalitions, and closure. Policy Sci 24, 1–18 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00146462

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