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Dispositional Monism and the Circularity Objection

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Metaphysica

Abstract

Three basic positions regarding the nature of fundamental properties are: dispositional monism, categorical monism and the mixed view. Dispositional monism apparently involves a regress or circularity, while an unpalatable consequence of categorical monism and the mixed view is that they are committed to quidditism. I discuss Alexander Bird's defence of dispositional monism based on the structuralist approach to identity. I argue that his solution does not help standard dispositional essentialism, as it admits the possibility that two distinct dispositional properties can possess the same stimuli and manifestations. Moreover, Bird's argument can be used to support the mixed view by relieving it of its commitment to quidditism. I briefly analyse an alternative defence of dispositional essentialism based on Leon Horsten's approach to the problem of circularity and impredicativity. I conclude that the best option is to choose Bird's solution but amend the dispositional perspective on properties. According to my proposal, the essences of dispositions are determined not directly by their stimuli and manifestations but by the role each property plays in the structure formed by the stimulus/manifestation relations.

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Notes

  1. Hannes Leitgeb and James Ladyman in (2008) go further and claim that identity and difference of vertices is fixed even in graphs that are symmetric, as a matter of ‘brute’ fact. They agree with the structuralist slogan that individuality of separate nodes is exhausted in the relations that the nodes bear to each other, but they insist that the identity and difference of nodes should be counted among their relations (p. 393). Consequently, even the simplest graph consisting of two nodes with no edge between them determines the fact that there are two distinct objects, and not one. However, we have to differentiate between numerical identity in a given world and transworld identity. It is true that in a two-node graph we have two distinct objects, but when we consider another possible world containing exactly the same structure, there is no way of telling which node in this world is identical with which node in our world. And I take it that in order to identify a particular dispositional property we have to be able to find its unique counterparts in at least some possible worlds. This, as I have argued, can only be achieved when the graph in question is asymmetric.

  2. Interestingly, from a structural point of view it is theoretically possible to accept a version of MV which admits a categorical property that is neither a stimulus nor a manifestation of any other property. But there can be only one such property, for if there were two, the entire structure would have a non-trivial automorphism which swaps these properties. Again, it is uncertain whether this theoretical possibility could have any concrete realisations.

References

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Acknowledgments

This paper contains some of the results of my research conducted in 2008/2009 at the Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, and supported by the Marie Curie Intra-European Grant No PIEF-GA-2008-220301. I am particularly grateful to Alexander Bird for fruitful and stimulating conversations on the subject.

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  1. Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland

    Tomasz Bigaj

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  1. Tomasz Bigaj
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Bigaj, T. Dispositional Monism and the Circularity Objection. Int Ontology Metaphysics 11, 39–47 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-010-0055-1

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