Abstract
Taking Per Martin-Löf’s constructive type theory as a starting-point a theory of assertion is developed, which is able to account for the epistemic aspects of the speech act of assertion, and in which it is shown that assertion is not a wide genus. From a constructivist point of view, one is entitled to assert, for example, that a proposition A is true, only if one has constructed a proof object a for A in an act of demonstration. One thereby has grounded the assertion by an act of demonstration, and a grounding account of assertion therefore suits constructive type theory. Because the act of demonstration in which such a proof object is constructed results in knowledge that A is true, the constructivist account of assertion has to ward off some of the criticism directed against knowledge accounts of assertion. It is especially the internal relation between a judgement being grounded and its being known that makes it possible to do so. The grounding account of assertion can be considered as a justification account of assertion, but it also differs from justification accounts recently proposed, namely in the treatment of selfless assertions, that is, assertions which are grounded, but are not accompanied by belief.
Article PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
Avoid common mistakes on your manuscript.
References
Austin J.L. (1962) How to do things with words. Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York 1984
Burge, T. (Ed.). (1986). Frege on truth. In Truth, though, reason: Essays on Frege (pp. 83–132). Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2005.
Burnyeat, M. (1990). The Theaetetus of Plato (with a translation of Plato’s Theaetetus). Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company.
Cohen L. J. (1992) An essay on belief and acceptance. Clarendon Press, Oxford
Davidson, D. (Ed.). (1984). Communication and convention. In Inquiries into truth and interpretation (pp. 265–280). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Douven I. (2006) Assertion, knowledge and rational credibility. Philosophical Review 115: 449–485
Dummett, M. (Ed.). (1973). Assertion. In Frege: Philosophy of language (Chapter 10, pp. 295–363). London: Duckworth. Second edition 1992.
Dummett, M. (Ed.). (1976). What is a theory of meaning (II). In The seas of language (pp. 34–93). Oxford: Clarendon Press. Originally in G. Evans & J. McDowell (Eds.), Truth and meaning. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.
Engel P. (2002) Truth. Acumen, Chesham
Frege, G. (1879). Begriffsschrift. In I. Angelelli (Ed.), Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze. Hildesheim, New York: Georg Olms. 1971.
Frege G. (1918) Der Gedanke. Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus 1: 58–77
Kvanvig J. (2009) Assertion, knowledge, and lotteries. In: Greenough P., Pritchard D. (eds) Williamson on knowledge. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 140–160
Lackey J (2007) Norms of assertion. Nous 41: 594–626
Martin-Löf, P. (1991). A path from logic to metaphysics. In Atti del Congresso Nuovi problemi della logica e della filosofia della scienza (Vol. II, pp. 141–149). Bologna: CLUEB.
Martin-Löf P. (1995) Verificationism then and now. In: Schlimanovich W., de Pauli E., Stadler F. (eds) The foundational debate. Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp 187–196
Martin-Löf P. (1996) On the meanings of the logical constants and the justification of the logical laws. Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 1: 11–61 (Originally presented in 1983.)
Martin-Löf P. (1998) Truth and knowability: On the principles C and K of Michael Dummett. In: Dales H. G., Oliveri G. (eds) Truth in mathematics. Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp 105–114
Newman J.H. (1870) An essay in aid of a grammar of assent. Clarendon Press, Oxford (I used the edition of 1985.)
Ranta A. (1994) Type-theoretical grammar. Clarendon Press, Oxford
Searle J. R. (1979) Expression and meaning. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Sundholm G. (1988) Oordeel en gevolgtrekking; bedreigde species? Inaugural lecture. Leiden University, Leiden
Sundholm G. (1994) Existence, proof and truth-making: A perspective on the intuitionistic conception of truth. Topoi 13: 117–126
Sundholm G. (1999) MacColl on judgement and inference. Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 3: 119–132
Sundholm G. (2004) Antirealism and the roles of truth. In: Niniluoto I., Sintonen M., Wolenski J. (eds) Handbook of epistemology. Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp 437–466
van der Schaar M. (2007) The assertion-candidate and the meaning of mood. Synthese 159: 61–82
van der Schaar, M. (2009). Judgement, belief and accepance. In G. Primiero & S. Rahman (Eds.), Acts of knowledge: History, philosophy and logic; essays dedicated to Göran Sundholm (pp. 267–286). London: College Publications.
van der Schaar, M. (2010). The cognitive act and the first-person perspective; an epistemology for constructive type theory. Synthese. doi:10.1007/s11229-009-9708-4.
Weiner M. (2005) Must we know what we say?. Philosophical Review 114: 227–251
Williams, B. (1973). Deciding to believe. In Problems of the self (pp. 136–151). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Williams B. (2002) Truth and truthfulness. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Williamson T. (1996) Knowing and asserting. Philosophical Review 105: 489–523
Acknowledgments
I thank Göran Sundholm, PerMartin-Löf, and Igor Douven for comments on a former version of the paper. I have presented the paper in Paris, and I am grateful to the organizer, Pascal Engel, and the public.
Open Access
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Open Access This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0), which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
About this article
Cite this article
van der Schaar, M. Assertion and grounding: a theory of assertion for constructive type theory. Synthese 183, 187–210 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9758-7
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9758-7