Abstract
Recent arguments for relativist semantic theories have centered on the phenomenon of “faultless disagreement.” This paper offers independent motivation for such theories, based on the interpretation of predicates of personal taste in certain attitude contexts and presuppositional constructions. It is argued that the correct interpretation falls out naturally from a relativist theory, but requires special stipulation in a theory which appeals instead to the use of hidden indexicals; and that a hidden indexical analysis presents problems for contemporary syntactic theory.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Beaver D. (1997). Presupposition. In: van Benthem J., ter Meulen A. (eds), Handbook of logic and language. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 939–1008
Egan A., Hawthorne J., Weatherson B. (2005). Epistemic modals in context. In: Preyer G., Peter G. (eds), Contextualism in philosophy: Knowledge, meaning and truth. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 131–168
von Fintel, K., & Gillies, A. S. (2006). CIA leaks. Ms., MIT, Cambridge, MA, and University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
Kaplan D. (1989). Demonstratives: An essay on the semantics, logic, metaphysics, and epistemology of demonstratives and other indexicals. In: Almog J., Perry J., Wettstein H. (eds), Themes from Kaplan. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 481–563
Kipasky P., Kiparsky C. (1971). Fact. In: Steinberg D.D., Jakobovits L.A. (eds), Semantics: An interdisciplinary reader. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 345–369
Kölbel M. (2002). Truth without objectivity. Routledge, London
Kölbel M. (2003). Faultless disagreement. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104: 53–73
Lasersohn P. (2005). Context dependence, disagreement, and predicates of personal taste. Linguistics and Philosophy 28, 643–686
Lewis D. (1979). Attitudes de dicto and de se. The Philosophical Review 88, 513–543
MacFarlane J. (2003). Future contingents and relative truth. The Philosophical Quarterly 53, 321–336
MacFarlane J. (2007). Semantic minimalism and nonindexical contextualism. In: Preyer G., Peter G. (eds), Context-sensitivity and semantic minimalism: New essays on semantics and pragmatics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 240–250
Morgan J. (1970). On the criterion of identity for noun phrase deletion. In Papers from the Sixth Regional Meeting, Chicago Linguistic Society. Chicago Linguistic Society, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, pp. 380–389
Moltmann, F. (2006). First-person oriented genericity and relative truth. Ms., IHPST, Paris.
Quine W.V. (1968). Propositional objects. Critica 2, 3–22
Richard M. (2004). Contextualism and relativism. Philosophical Studies 119, 215–242
Stalnaker R. (1999). Context and content: Essays in intentionality in speech and thought. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Williamson T. (1994). Vagueness. Routledge, London
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Lasersohn, P. Relative truth, speaker commitment, and control of implicit arguments. Synthese 166, 359–374 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9280-8
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9280-8