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Formal Methods in the Philosophy of Science

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Abstract

In this article, we reflect on the use of formal methods in the philosophy of science. These are taken to comprise not just methods from logic broadly conceived, but also from other formal disciplines such as probability theory, game theory, and graph theory. We explain how formal modelling in the philosophy of science can shed light on difficult problems in this domain.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, 9 Woodland Road, Bristol, BS81TB, UK

    Leon Horsten

  2. Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Institute of Philosophy, Kardinaal Mercierplein 2, B-3000, Leuven, Belgium

    Leon Horsten & Igor Douven

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  1. Leon Horsten
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  2. Igor Douven
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Correspondence to Leon Horsten.

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Horsten, L., Douven, I. Formal Methods in the Philosophy of Science. Stud Logica 89, 151–162 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-008-9129-2

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