Abstract
Contrary to my critics, voter irrationality does not imply that economists cannot mitigate political failure. With rational voters, reform-minded economists have few viable tactics; with irrational voters reformers have more options. Rational voters can be swayed only by facts and logic; irrational voters could respond to better rhetoric. Rational voters strategically punish those who ignore their policy preferences; irrational voters use less effective disciplinary strategies that create political slack. Even with irrational voters, efficiency-enhancing reform is hard. With rational voters, however, democracy’s failure to adopt a reform is strong evidence that the reform does not enhance efficiency.
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I thank Elle Cohen and Marta Podemska for excellent research assistance, the Mercatus Center for financial support, and members of the Ratio Institute and the Mont Pelerin Society for helpful comments.
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Caplan, B. Persuasion, slack, and traps: how can economists change the world?. Public Choice 142, 1–8 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9521-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9521-0