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Reversing the side-effect effect: the power of salient norms

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Abstract

In the last decade, experimental philosophers have documented systematic asymmetries in the attributions of mental attitudes to agents who produce different types of side effects. We argue that this effect is driven not simply by the violation of a norm, but by salient-norm violation. As evidence for this hypothesis, we present two new studies in which two conflicting norms are present, and one or both of them is raised to salience. Expanding one’s view to these additional cases presents, we argue, a fuller conception of the side-effect effect, which can be reversed by reversing which norm is salient.

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Notes

  1. The Setup and Salience pieces appeared on the screen together. The names listed here for each of the four Salience conditions were not visible to our participants.

  2. Just prior to this step, half of our participants were presented with Expectation questions, asking them “What do you think Carl should do?” and “What do you think Carl will do?” (in random order). We were interested in testing a secondary prediction that participants’ normative or descriptive expectations could at least partially be influencing their attributions of intentionality. We found partial mediation for the normative expectation question, though the results are too complex and tangential to cover sufficiently here.

  3. A 4 (Norm Salience) × 2 (Outcome) MANOVA was conducted on the 4 dependent variables. Using Pillai’s trace, we observed significant effects of Norm Salience, V = .20, F(12, 984) = 5.93, p < .001, and Outcome, V = .47, F(4, 326) = 70.84, p < .001, as well as a significant interaction of Norm Salience and Outcome, V = .10, F(12, 984) = 2.82, p < .001. The follow-up univariate tests examine the precise nature of the effect of these predictors on each of our four dependent variables.

  4. A two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) indicated a significant main effects for both the Outcome factor, F(1, 331) = 66.54, p < .001, partial η 2 = .17 and the Norm Salience factor, F(3, 331) = 4.44, p < .001, partial η 2 = .04. A significant interaction of norm salience and outcome condition was also apparent, F(1, 331) = 3.49, p = .016, partial η 2 = .03. To contextualize these results, partial η 2 is a measure of effect size. More specifically it is an estimate of the percentage of variance accounted for by a predictor in the model. The commonly cited cut-off values for “small”, “medium”, and “large” effect sizes are .01, .06, and .14, respectively (Cohen 1988).

  5. Follow-up tests of simple effects allowed us to examine the effect of one factor (e.g., norm salience) within one level of a second factor (e.g., outcome). This revealed a significant effect of Norm Salience within the Carl Donates condition of the Outcome factor, F(3, 162) = 7.13, p < .001, partial η 2 = .12. This indicates that when Carl donates the money, participants in the Others Norm condition rated the degree to which Carl intentionally helped as lower than did participants in the three other norm salience conditions, b = −2.57 (.56), p < .001.

  6. Once again, a two-way ANOVA indicated a significant main effect for both the Norm Salience, F(3, 329) = 3.37, p = .019, partial η 2 = .03, and the Outcome factors, F(1, 329) = 114.09, p < .001, partial η 2 = .25. We again found a significant interaction of the Norm Salience and Outcome factors, F(3, 329) = 2.80, p = .040, partial η 2 = .02.

  7. Follow-up simple effects tests revealed a significant difference within the Invest condition of the Outcome factor, F(3, 167) = 4.88, p = .003, partial η 2 = .08. Simple contrasts indicated that when Carl invested, participants in the Self Norm condition were less inclined to report that Carl had considered making his retirement more comfortable, b = −2.46 (.66), p < .001.

  8. A 4 (norm salience) × 2 (outcome) analysis of variance (ANOVA) indicated a significant main effect for both the Norm Salience, F(3, 330) = 16.44, p < .001, partial η 2 = .13, and the Outcome factors, F(1, 330) = 122.04, p < .001, partial η 2 = .27 on participants’ ratings of the extent to which Carl considered helping others. As before, there was a significant interaction of norm salience and outcome condition was also observed, F(3, 330) = 5.87, p = .001, partial η 2 = .05.

  9. Follow-up tests of simple effects revealed a significant difference within the Carl Donates condition of the outcome factor, F(3, 162) = 8.27, p < .001, partial η 2 = .13. Simple contrasts reveal that when Carl donates, participants in the Others Norm condition rated the degree to which Carl considered helping as lower than participants in the other three norm salience conditions, b = −2.54 (.52), p < .001.

  10. A two-way ANOVA on participants’ ratings of the extent to which Carl considered making his retirement more comfortable indicated a significant main effect for both the Norm Salience, F(3, 330) = 6.13, p < .001, partial η 2 = .05, and the Outcome factors, F(1, 330) = 42.33, p < .001, partial η 2 = .11.

  11. Post-hoc analyses using Tukey’s HSD on the Norm Salience factor indicated a significant difference between the Self Norm and the Others Norm conditions, M diff  = .84, p < .039.

  12. It is worth noting that, since we are using vignettes as the data points, there are not 72 separate conditions of interest; rather there are only 6 (from a 2 × 3 design).

  13. As in Study I, after the Setup (and before the protagonist makes a choice) we also asked half of our participants (equally distributed among the other conditions) two expectation questions regarding what they thought the protagonist would and should do. As before, we found partial mediation for the normative expectation question. Since the results are complex and tangential, we shall not go into them here.

  14. The first paragraphs (which did not vary across conditions) of all twelve narrative contexts are available in the Appendix, as are all six conditions from two of the narrative contexts.

  15. We performed a 3 (Norm Salience) × 2 (Outcome) repeated-measures analysis of variance (RM-ANOVA), which revealed a significant interaction effect of norm salience and outcome for the Intentionally Violated dependent variables, F(2, 22) = 58.41, p < .001, and a significant main effect of the Norm Salience factor F(2, 22) = 16.20, p < .001.

  16. Within the Law Violated condition of the Outcome factor, we find a significant effect of the Norm Salience factor, F(2, 22) = 66.11, p < .001.

  17. b = −1.46 (.12), p < .001.

  18. Within the Morality Violated condition, there is a significant effect of the Norm Salience factor, F(2, 22) = 14.35, p < .001.

  19. b = −.80 (.21), p < .001.

  20. A 3 (Norm Salience) × 2 (Outcome) RM-ANOVA shows a significant interaction for the Desired to Violate variable, F(2, 22) = 31.27, p < .001.

  21. Within the Law Violated condition, we find a significant effect of the Norm Salience factor, F(2, 22) = 21.72, p < .001.

  22. b = −.71 (.14), p < .001.

  23. Within the Morality Violated condition, we find a significant effect of the Norm Salience factor, F(2, 22) = 5.96, p = .009.

  24. A simple contrast revealed a significant difference between the means, b = −.47 (.18), p = .014.

  25. Results of the 3 (Norm Salience) × 2 (Outcome) RM-ANOVA reveal that there is a significant main effect of the Norm Salient factor F(2, 22) = 12.34, p < .001, and a significant main effect of the Outcome factor, F(1, 11) = 48.57, p < .001. There is also a significant interaction, F(2, 22) = 73.48, p < .001.

  26. There is a significant effect of the Norm Salience factor, F(2, 22) = 61.37, p < .001.

  27. b = −1.52 (.15), p < .001.

  28. There is a significant simple effect of the Norm Salience factor, F(2, 22) = 28.12, p < .001.

  29. b = 1.10 (.15), p < .001.

  30. The initial 3 (Norm Salience) × 2 (Outcome) ANOVA shows a significant interaction, F(2, 22) = 4.75, p < .019, and a significant main effect of the Outcome factor, F(1, 11) = 36.10, p < .001.

  31. F(2, 22) = 4.89, p = .018.

  32. b = .53 (.21), p = .016.

  33. A 3 (Norm Salience) × 2 (Outcome) RM-ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the Outcome factor, F(1, 11) = 30.12, p < .001, as well as a significant interaction effect, F(2, 22) = 8.85, p = .002.

  34. F(2, 22) = 8.43, p = .002.

  35. b = .55 (.18), p = .003.

  36. A 3 (Norm Salience) × 2 (Outcome) RM-ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the Outcome factor, F(1, 11) = 40.93, p < .001, and a significant interaction effect, F(2, 22) = 3.79, p = .039.

  37. We also asked participants to rate their agreement with two additional statements: “The CEO considered whether the organizational changes would be legal,” and “The CEO considered whether the organizational changes would be morally acceptable.” Neither the main effects nor the interaction effects were significant for the Considered Legal question. We did observe a significant effect of the Outcome factor on the Considered Morality question, F(1, 11) = 18.66, p = .001. When the law was violated, participants were more willing to report that the protagonist considered whether the changes would be moral than when morality was violated. The lack of any significant effect for the Considered Legal question is curious, especially since the considered variables displayed the side-effect effect in Study I. We suspect this difference is in part due to a change in the wording from Study I (“Carl considered helping/retiring…”) to Study II (“considered whether the changes would be moral/legal”). The former is considering producing a particular outcome. Hence, we don’t find this result particularly worrisome, especially since the three violate variables behaved as predicted.

  38. Earlier we stated that Alfano et al. (2013) were on the right track with their belief heuristics and attempt to unify various instances of the side-effect effect. We take our findings and hypothesis to be consistent with, but distinct from, Alfano et al. (2012). The belief heuristics were focused on the rational for the narrative’s protagonist to have beliefs in some cases but not others. Our focus here was different; we hypothesize that the participant asymmetrically attributes intentionality and the like based on whether the participant noticed the protagonist violate a salient norm. Additionally, regardless of whether or not the account of Alfano et al. (2012) succeeds in providing a unified account of the side-effect effect, such success or failure will not disprove our demonstrated ability to control the effect by alternating which norm is salient.

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Acknowledgments

We would like to thank the organizers of the Experiments in Ethical Dilemmas conference (Natalie Gold, Andrew Colman, and Briony Pulford) and the Buffalo Experimental Philosophy Conference (James Beebe, Paul Poenicke, and Neil Otte), where portions of this paper were presented. We would also like to thank Urs Fischbacher, Shaun Nichols, Florian Cova, Zachary Horne, Derek Powell, Jennifer Cole Wright, Alex Voorhoeve, Josh May, Joshua Alexander, Chad Gonnerman, John Waterman, John Turri, Wesley Buckwalter, and Genoveva Martí for their insightful comments and questions. Finally, we would like especially to thank Fiery Cushman for suggesting the methodology in Study II and advising its implementation.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Grand Valley State University, 1 Campus Drive, Allendale, MI, 49401, USA

    Brian Robinson

  2. Department of Psychology, University of Notre Dame, 118 Haggar Hall, Notre Dame, IN, 46556, USA

    Paul Stey

  3. Department of Philosophy, University of Oregon, 232 Susan Campbell Hall, Eugene, OR, 97403, USA

    Mark Alfano

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  1. Brian Robinson
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  2. Paul Stey
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Correspondence to Brian Robinson.

Appendix

Appendix

First Paragraph of Twelve Vignette Settings:

  1. (1)

    Nazi Racial Identification: “In Nazi Germany, there was a law called the ‘racial identification law.’ The purpose of the law was to help identify people of certain races so that they could be rounded up and sent to concentration camps. It also made it impossible to fulfill the racial identification law and the moral duty to protect innocent people.”

  2. (2)

    Japanese Internment: “In the United States during World War II, there was a law called the ‘Japanese Internment law.’ The purpose of the law was to round up all Japanese Americans, remove them from their homes, and send them to internment camps. It also made it impossible to fulfill the Japanese Internment law and the moral duty to protect innocent people.”

  3. (3)

    Jim Crow: “In the last century in the United States, there were laws called the ‘Jim Crow laws.’ Part of the purpose of these laws was to segregate blacks from whites in the public school systems. It also made it impossible to fulfill the Jim Crow laws and the moral duty to treat everyone with dignity.”

  4. (4)

    The Hunger Games: “In the nation of Panem, there was a law that called for ‘the Reaping.’ The purpose of the law was to have parents enter their children into a lottery so that a few of them would be selected and sacrificed for the good of the entire country. It also made it impossible to fulfill the Reaping law and the moral duty to protect children.”

  5. (5)

    Soviet Propaganda: “In the Soviet Union, there was a law called ‘the Anti-Soviet Agitation law.’ The purpose of the law was to require radio announcers to read only state approved news items as part of the state’s propaganda campaign. It also made it impossible to fulfill the Anti-Soviet Agitation law and the moral duty not to engage in propaganda.”

  6. (6)

    Fahrenheit 451: “In a fictional country, there was a law called ‘the firemen’s law.’ The purpose of the law was to have firemen burn all books so that the conflicting views contained in them wouldn’t offend anyone. It also made it impossible to fulfill the firemen’s law and the moral duty not to engage in censorship.”

  7. (7)

    Underground Railroad: “In the United States in the 1850s, there was a law called ‘the fugitive slave law.’ The purpose of the law was to make it illegal to help slaves escape from their owners. It also made it impossible to fulfill the fugitive slave law and moral duty not to treat people as slaves. Shortly after this law was passed, the owner of hotel decided to make certain organizational changes.”

  8. (8)

    Trail of Tears: “In the United States in the 1830s, there was a law called ‘the Indian Removal Act.’ The purpose of the law was to require several Native American tribes to relocate west of the Mississippi River, sometimes by means of military force. It also made it impossible to fulfill the Indian Removal Act and the moral duty not to force people from their land.”

  9. (9)

    Spanish Inquisition: “In the Spanish Empire in the fifteenth and sixteenth century, there was a law that called for the Inquisition. The purpose of the law was to force Jews and Muslims to convert to Christianity and used methods that included torture and murder. It also made it impossible to fulfill the requirements of the Inquisition and the moral duty not to torture and murder people.”

  10. (10)

    Diocletianic Persecution: “In the late Roman Empire, there was a law called ‘the Edict of Diocletian.’ The purpose of the law was to persecute Christians, which included public execution. It also made it impossible to fulfill the Edict of Diocletian and the moral duty not to execute people for their religious beliefs.”

  11. (11)

    Zimbabwe Land Resettlement: “In the nation of Zimbabwe, there was a law called ‘the Fast-Track Land Resettlement Program.’ The purpose of the law was to remove rich ethnic minorities from their farms without compensation and sometimes violently in order to give the land to poor ethnic minorities. It also made it impossible to fulfill the Fast-Track Land Resettlement Program and the moral duty not to steal from people.”

  12. (12)

    English Married Women’s Property: “In nineteenth century England, there was a law called the ‘Coverture law.’ The purpose of the law was to deny married women the right to own any property, transferring anything she had owned to her husband. It also made it impossible to fulfill the Coverture law and the moral duty not to discriminate against anyone based on gender.”

Nazi Racial Identification Stimuli:

Legal Norm Salient/Law Violated

In Nazi Germany, there was a law called the ‘racial identification law.’ The purpose of the law was to help identify people of certain races so that they could be rounded up and sent to concentration camps. It also made it impossible to fulfill the racial identification law and the moral duty to protect innocent people.

Shortly after this law was passed, the CEO of a small corporation decided to make certain organizational changes.

The Vice-President of the corporation said: “By making those changes, you’ll definitely be increasing our profits. But you’ll also be violating the requirements of the racial identification law.”

The CEO said: “Look, I don’t care one bit about that. All I care about is making as much profit as I can. Let’s make those organizational changes!”

As soon as the CEO gave this order, the corporation began making the organizational changes and the results were exactly as the Vice-President predicted.

Legal Norm Salient/Law Fulfilled

In Nazi Germany, there was a law called the ‘racial identification law.’ The purpose of the law was to help identify people of certain races so that they could be rounded up and sent to concentration camps. It also made it impossible to fulfill the racial identification law and the moral duty to protect innocent people.

Shortly after this law was passed, the CEO of a small corporation decided to make certain organizational changes.

The Vice-President of the corporation said: “By making those changes, you’ll definitely be increasing our profits. But you’ll also be fulfilling the requirements of the racial identification law.”

The CEO said: “Look, I don’t care one bit about that. All I care about is making as much profit as I can. Let’s make those organizational changes!”

As soon as the CEO gave this order, the corporation began making the organizational changes and the results were exactly as the Vice-President predicted.

Moral Norm Salient/Morality Violated

In Nazi Germany, there was a law called the ‘racial identification law.’ The purpose of the law was to help identify people of certain races so that they could be rounded up and sent to concentration camps. It also made it impossible to fulfill the racial identification law and the moral duty to protect innocent people.

Shortly after this law was passed, the CEO of a small corporation decided to make certain organizational changes.

The Vice-President of the corporation said: “By making those changes, you’ll definitely be increasing our profits. But you’ll also be violating the moral duty to protect innocent people.”

The CEO said: “Look, I don’t care one bit about that. All I care about is making as much profit as I can. Let’s make those organizational changes!”

As soon as the CEO gave this order, the corporation began making the organizational changes and the results were exactly as the Vice-President predicted.

Moral Norm Salient/Morality Fulfilled

In Nazi Germany, there was a law called the ‘racial identification law.’ The purpose of the law was to help identify people of certain races so that they could be rounded up and sent to concentration camps. It also made it impossible to fulfill the racial identification law and the moral duty to protect innocent people.

Shortly after this law was passed, the CEO of a small corporation decided to make certain organizational changes.

The Vice-President of the corporation said: “By making those changes, you’ll definitely be increasing our profits. But you’ll also be fulfilling the moral duty to protect innocent people.”

The CEO said: “Look, I don’t care one bit about that. All I care about is making as much profit as I can. Let’s make those organizational changes!”

As soon as the CEO gave this order, the corporation began making the organizational changes and the results were exactly as the Vice-President predicted.

1.1 Both Norms Salient/Law Violated

In Nazi Germany, there was a law called the ‘racial identification law.’ The purpose of the law was to help identify people of certain races so that they could be rounded up and sent to concentration camps. It also made it impossible to fulfill the racial identification law and the moral duty to protect innocent people.

Shortly after this law was passed, the CEO of a small corporation decided to make certain organizational changes.

The Vice-President of the corporation said: “By making those changes, you’ll definitely be increasing our profits. But you’ll also be violating be the requirements of the racial identification law and fulfilling the moral duty to protect innocent people.”

The CEO said: “Look, I don’t care one bit about that. All I care about is making as much profit as I can. Let’s make those organizational changes!”

As soon as the CEO gave this order, the corporation began making the organizational changes and the results were exactly as the Vice-President predicted.

Both Norms Salient/Morality Violated

In Nazi Germany, there was a law called the ‘racial identification law.’ The purpose of the law was to help identify people of certain races so that they could be rounded up and sent to concentration camps. It also made it impossible to fulfill the racial identification law and the moral duty to protect innocent people.

Shortly after this law was passed, the CEO of a small corporation decided to make certain organizational changes.

The Vice-President of the corporation said: “By making those changes, you’ll definitely be increasing our profits. But you’ll also be violating the moral duty to protect innocent people and be fulfilling the requirements of the racial identification law.”

The CEO said: “Look, I don’t care one bit about that. All I care about is making as much profit as I can. Let’s make those organizational changes!”

As soon as the CEO gave this order, the corporation began making the organizational changes and the results were exactly as the Vice-President predicted.

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Robinson, B., Stey, P. & Alfano, M. Reversing the side-effect effect: the power of salient norms. Philos Stud 172, 177–206 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0283-2

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