Abstract
Dennett’s heterophenomenology and the critical phenomenology that I outline may be thought of as competing accounts of a cautious approach to phenomenal description and method. One can be critical or cautious about how well or how reliably a subject can communicate his or her subjective experience in experimental settings, without for a moment doubting their existence or claiming them to be something completely different to how they seem. Given this, Dennett’s heterophenomenology with its accompanying “qualia denial” looks like nothing more than an attempt to shore up his counterintuitive, eliminativist philosophy of mind.
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Velmans, M. Heterophenomenology versus critical phenomenology. Phenom Cogn Sci 6, 221–230 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-006-9033-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-006-9033-z