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The Argumentative Structure of Persuasive Definitions

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Abstract

In this paper we present an analysis of persuasive definition based on argumentation schemes. Using the medieval notion of differentia and the traditional approach to topics, we explain the persuasiveness of emotive terms in persuasive definitions by applying the argumentation schemes for argument from classification and argument from values. Persuasive definitions, we hold, are persuasive because their goal is to modify the emotive meaning denotation of a persuasive term in a way that contains an implicit argument from values. However, our theory is different from Stevenson’s, a positivistic view that sees emotive meaning as subjective, and defines it as a behavioral effect. Our proposal is to treat the persuasiveness produced by the use of emotive words and persuasive definitions as due to implicit arguments that an interlocutor may not be aware of. We use congruence theory to provide the linguistic framework for connecting a term with the function it is supposed to play in a text. Our account allows us to distinguish between conflicts of values and conflicts of classifications.

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Notes

  1. «[…] d’une façon générale, nous décrirons les prédicats de la langue –par exemple le verbe travailler, comme des faisceaux de topoi. Comprendre le mot travailler, c’est s’estimer capable d’établir une gradation G0 dans un certain domaine d’activité, définie par le fait qu’elle est en correspondance avec une série d’autres gradations G’1, G’2… Chacune de ces correspondances est un topos (…) Chacune des gradations est elle-même en correspondance, via d’autres topoï, avec une série d’autres gradations. Le champ lexical devient donc une sorte de champ topique.» (Ducrot and Anscombre (1986), p. 89).

  2. “Let us resume our inquiry and state, in view of the fact that all knowledge and every pursuit aims at some good, what it is that we say political science aims at and what is the highest of all goods achievable by action. Verbally there is very general agreement; for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is happiness, and identify living well and doing well with being happy; but with regard to what happiness is they differ, and the many do not give the same account as the wise. For the former think it is some plain and obvious thing, like pleasure, wealth, or honour” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I, 4); “To judge from the lives that men lead, most men, and men of the most vulgar type, seem (not without some ground) to identify the good, or happiness, with pleasure; which is the reason why they love the life of enjoyment” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I, 5). See also Topics III, 7: “Also, the same things are more valuable if accompanied than if unaccompanied by pleasure, and likewise when free from pain than when attended with pain”.

  3. «[…] quod enim uniuscuiusque causa est, id eam rem efficit cuius est causa» (Boethiius, De Differentiis Topics, 1189c).

  4. Aristotle (1939), Topics II, 9.

  5. The relation between emotive words and reasons given to support the predication is pointed out also in Manicas and Kruger’s studies on decision-making: “[…] it might be possible to bring to bear a rational criticism, for usually the expressions of feelings of like and dislike are predicated on reasons, which, when explored, are often seen to contain a mixture of factual presuppositions and broad evaluative considerations. Thus, reasons for liking the play might be its witty dialogue, its fast “pace”, and the insights it reveals into the psychology of adolescents. Reasons for disliking the play might be its superficial characterization, its lack of a coherent plot, and its “forced” ending. But all of these reasons are of a factual nature and presuppose certain norms for plays, and are thus subject to rational discussion” (Manicas and Kruger 1968, p. 427).

  6. The relation between desirability, choice, and endoxa can be found in Cicero’s De Inventione. Cicero, analyzing deliberation, gives a value scale: «Rerum expetandarum tria genera sunt; par autem numerus vitandarum ex contraria parte. Nam est quidam, quod sua vi nos adlicitat ad sese, non emolumento captans aliquo, sed trahens sua dignitate, quod genus virtus, scientia, veritas. Est aliud autem non propter suam vim et naturam, sed propter fructum atque utilitatem petendum; quod <genus> pecunia est. Est porro quiddam ex horum partibus iunctum, quod et sua vi et dignitate nos inlectos ducit et prae se quandam gerit utilitatem, quo magis expetatur, ut amicitia, bona existimatio.» (Cicero, De Inventione, II, 52).

  7. M.F. Quintiliani Institutionis Oratoriae, VI, 2, 5: « Probationes enim efficiant sane ut causam nostram meliorem esse iudices putent, adfectus praestant ut etiam velint; sed id quod volunt credunt quoque».

  8. “[…] emotions essentially involve desires, expectations, purposes, and attitude. Emotions are motivated by desires, sometimes distinguished by desires, and in virtually every case some desire is essential to an emotion” ((Solomon, 2003, p. 20)

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Linguistics, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 20100, Milan, Italy

    Fabrizio Macagno

  2. Centre for Research on Reasoning, Argumentation and Rhetoric, University of Windsor, Ontario, Canada

    Douglas Walton

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  1. Fabrizio Macagno
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  2. Douglas Walton
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Correspondence to Douglas Walton.

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Macagno, F., Walton, D. The Argumentative Structure of Persuasive Definitions. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 11, 525–549 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-008-9119-5

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