Abstract
A Nash equilibrium (NE) in a multi-agent game is a strategy profile that is resilient to unilateral deviations. A strong Nash equilibrium (SE) is one that is stable against coordinated deviations of any coalition. We show that, in the load balancing games, NEs approximate SEs in the sense that the benefit of each member of any coalition from coordinated deviations is well limited. Furthermore, we show that an easily recognizable special subset of NEs exhibit even better approximation of SEs.
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Supported by “Taishan Scholar” Project in Applied Mathematics, Qufu Normal University.
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Chen, B. Equilibria in load balancing games. Acta Math. Appl. Sin. Engl. Ser. 25, 723–736 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10255-009-8832-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10255-009-8832-8