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Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule

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Abstract

We analyze the effects of voter coordination on the equilibrium of voting games. Specifically, we analyze the concepts of strong equilibrium and coalition-proof equilibrium for plurality rule and runoff rule elections. We characterize these equilibria in the three candidate case, and provide results for important special cases in the general multicandidate case.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. IGIER, Bocconi University, Milan, Italy

    Matthias Messner

  2. Department of Economics, University of Illinois, 1206 S Sixth Street, Champaign, IL, 61820, USA

    Mattias K. Polborn

Authors
  1. Matthias Messner
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  2. Mattias K. Polborn
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Correspondence to Mattias K. Polborn.

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Messner, M., Polborn, M.K. Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule. Int J Game Theory 35, 287–314 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0048-z

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0048-z

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