Abstract
Philosophers and others concerned with the moral good of personal privacy most often see threats to privacy raised by the development of pervasive computing as primarily being threats to the loss of control over personal information. Two reasons in particular lend this approach plausibility. One reason is that the parallels between pervasive computing and ordinary networked computing, where everyday transactions over the Internet raise concerns about personal information privacy, appear stronger than their differences. Another reason is that the individual devices which can become linked in a pervasive computing environment: PDAs, GPS sensors, RFID chips/readers, publicly-located video surveillance cameras, Internet-enabled mobile phones, and the like, each raise threats to individual privacy. Without discounting the value of this approach, this paper aims to propose an alternative; and, as a result of recasting the threat to individual privacy from pervasive computing, to identify other, and deeper, moral goods that pervasive computing puts at risk that otherwise might remain concealed. In particular, I argue that pervasive computing threatens to compromise what I call existential autonomy: the right to decide for ourselves at least some of the existential conditions under which we form and develop our ways of life, including our relations to information technology. From this perspective, some moral goods at stake in protecting privacy in an environment of pervasive computing emerge that have less to do with furthering human well-being through the promotion of self-identity and subjectivity, than with stimulating curiosity, receptivity to difference, and, most broadly, openness to the world.
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Notes
Mark Weiser coined the term “ubiquitous computing” in the course of imagining a world where human use of computing technology would be more fluid and natural than at present because the physical world would be “richly and invisibly interwoven with sensors, actuators, displays, and computational elements, embedded seamlessly in the everyday objects of our lives and connected through a continuous network” (Weiser et al. 1999, p. 694). Later, he came to call this world one of “calm technology,” an expression which gave greater emphasis to the effect on human interaction with information technologies once these technologies become “naturalized” into the physical world (Weiser and Brown 1996). “Pervasive computing” can be understood as the implementation of ubiquitous computing through a constellation of technologies—some information processors, such as biosensors and RFID chips embedded in the environment and others, such as mobile phones, still visibly and physically at hand—but all linked with one another by means of networked communication (Kenny 2006). Other expressions, such as “ambient intelligence” and “the Internet of Things,” emphasize how in a pervasive computing environment decisions are made based on information received and exchanged, without the need for human agency.
Retrieved 30 November 2008 from http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2002/oxygen.html.
For example, the European Commission report on “Your Voice in Europe,” notes “The vision of an ‘Internet of Things” is compelling, but many of the foreseen uses are not expected in the near future (according to some participants not in the next 10 years).” (European Commission 2006, p. 18).
I am using the phrase “technological information” here in the sense inspired by Albert Borgmann (1999): namely, information generated in a setting defined by information technology.
A description of how the Apple iPhone’s built-in GPS application differs from regular GPS technology can be found at http://www.apple.com/iphone/features/gps.html (retrieved 29 Nov 2008).
Like the second illustration above, this is a hypothetical example. It is however the case that Marks and Spencer has already been tagging a few select categories of items already, for purposes of more effectively insuring that shelves are stocked and controlling shoplifting. See http://www.adt.com/wps/portal/adt/medium_large_business/reference_library/?wgc=Item_Level_RFID (retrieved 30 Nov 2008). Item-level tagging is also discussed in Locton and Rosenberg 2005.
Michelfelder, “ Web 2.0: Community as Commodity,” presented at the Good Life in a Technological Age (GLITA) conference at the University of Twente, June 2008 (unpublished paper).
The view I am expressing here can be contrasted with that of Luciano Floridi (2007), who predicts that in the new ontological environment of the “infosphere,” we as “inforgs” would experience symptoms of physical distress were we to be cut off from it.
Retrieved 14 Dec 2008 at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ambient_intelligence.
An earlier version of this paper was first given at the 2005 meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Technology in Park City, Utah; it has been substantially revised for publication here. I wish to thank my commentator on that paper, Pat Corey, for a most careful reading and helpful comments. I am also grateful to Albert Fritzsche of the Institute for Philosophy at the University of Stuttgart for calling to my attention studies related to the development of RFID and pervasive computing within Europe.
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Michelfelder, D.P. Philosophy, privacy, and pervasive computing. AI & Soc 25, 61–70 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-009-0233-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-009-0233-2