Abstract
The issue of rapprochement between former adversaries has received scant scholarly attention meaning there is little understanding of why some foes reconcile quickly, while others remain hostile for decades. Moreover, a specific facet of reconciliation, diplomatic normalization, while a crucial part of diplomacy, has not been explained by scholarly work. This study advances research on diplomatic normalization while proposing a novel theory of reconciliation involving Kantian elements: commerce, democracy, and law. Specifically, the paper proposes that significant economic incentives generate domestic lobbies in favour of normalization, while democratic norms and international institutions generate trust and transparency. This theory is tested on a new dataset that includes all potential cases of reconciliation after warfare since World War II. Survival analysis shows that market size, shared democracy, and joint international organization membership are significantly related to faster reconciliation. The causal mechanisms are examined in a case study of US—Vietnamese rapprochement. The policy implications for these findings and the limitations for political leaders are also discussed.
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Notes
See Appendix 2 for details on the differences between the two datasets.
In instances where states fought more than one war, the period under study begins with the conclusion of the first conflict and continues until normalization. In the case of India-Pakistan, normalization occurred between conflicts, meaning three separate dyads were included in the data (see Appendix 1).
A trichotomous scale was also tried but did not resolve collinearity issues. Moving the cut-point from the fiftieth percentile to the fortieth did not substantively change the results.
The count variable of IO memberships correlates with trade dependence at .51, land border at .5, and war over territory at .43.
Specifically, this variable receives a one when the “durable” variable in Polity is zero.
An anonymous reviewer made the helpful suggestion to include this variable.
I wish to thank an anonymous review for suggesting including this variable.
In alternative tests, where territory, land border, and trade dependence were all removed due to high correlation (> 0.5), a count version of shared IO membership led to a 4% increase in the likelihood of normalization for each shared membership.
Unfortunately, this model requires shared IO membership to be removed in order to achieve convergence and only has 375 observations across 15 dyads.
It is also important to note that all these numbers proceed the USA extending Normal Trade Relations (NTR) to Vietnam in December 2001, which caused trade volume to double in one year.
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Appendices
Appendix 1
State 1 | State 2 | War | Diplomatic relations end | Diplomatic relations resume |
---|---|---|---|---|
Israel | Egypt | Arab–Israeli/ Sinai/ Six-Day/ War of Attrition/ Yom Kippur War | 1948 | 1980 |
Jordan | Israel | Arab–Israeli/ Six-Day/ Yom Kippur War | 1948 | 1995 |
Syria | Israel | Arab–Israeli/ Six-Day/ Yom Kippur/ War over Lebanon | 1948 | – |
Iraq | Israel | Arab–Israeli/ Yom Kippur War | 1948 | – |
India | China | Assam | 1962 | 1976 |
Armenia | Azerbaijan | Azeri-Armenian | 1992 | – |
Ethiopia | Eritrea | Badme Border | 1998 | – |
India | Pakistan | Bangladesh | 1971 | 1977 |
Bosnia | Yugoslavia | Bosnian Independence | 1992 | 1996 |
Croatia | Yugoslavia | Bosnian Independence | 1992 | 1996 |
UK | Argentina | Falkland Islands War | 1982 | 1990 |
El Salvador | Honduras | Football War | 1969 | 1982 |
Canada | Iraq | Gulf War | 1991 | 2004 |
Egypt | Iraq | Gulf War | 1991 | 2001 |
France | Iraq | Gulf War | 1991 | 2004 |
Kuwait | Iraq | Gulf War | 1990 | 2004 |
Morocco | Iraq | Gulf War | 1991 | 1991 |
Oman | Iraq | Gulf War | 1991 | 1991 |
Saudi Arabia | Iraq | Gulf War | 1991 | – |
Syria | Iraq | Gulf War | 1991 | 2007 |
United Arab Emirates | Iraq | Gulf War | 1991 | 1991 |
USA | Iraq | Gulf War | 1991 | 2004 |
UK | Iraq | Gulf War/ Invasion of Iraq | 1991 | 2004 |
France | Morocco | Ifni War | 1958 | 1958 |
Spain | Morocco | Ifni War | 1957 | 1958 |
Canada | Afghanistan | Invasion of Afghanistan | 2001 | 2002 |
France | Afghanistan | Invasion of Afghanistan | 2001 | 2002 |
USA | Afghanistan | Invasion of Afghanistan | 2001 | 2002 |
Australia | Iraq | Invasion of Iraq | 2003 | 2004 |
Iran | Iraq | Iran-Iraq War | 1980 | 1991 |
India | Pakistan | Kargil War | 1999 | 2001 |
Australia | China | Korean War | 1950 | 1972 |
Australia | PR Korea | Korean War | 1950 | 2000 |
Belgium | China | Korean War | 1951 | 1972 |
Belgium | PR Korea | Korean War | 1951 | 2001 |
Canada | China | Korean War | 1950 | 1970 |
Canada | PR Korea | Korean War | 1950 | 2001 |
Colombia | China | Korean War | 1951 | 1981 |
Colombia | PR Korea | Korean War | 1951 | 1989 |
Ethiopia | China | Korean War | 1951 | 1971 |
Ethiopia | PR Korea | Korean War | 1951 | 1975 |
France | China | Korean War | 1951 | 1964 |
France | PR Korea | Korean War | 1951 | – |
Greece | China | Korean War | 1951 | 1972 |
Greece | PR Korea | Korean War | 1951 | 2001 |
Netherlands | China | Korean War | 1951 | 1953 |
Netherlands | PR Korea | Korean War | 1951 | 2001 |
Philippines | China | Korean War | 1950 | 1975 |
Philippines | PR Korea | Korean War | 1950 | 2000 |
Republic of Korea | China | Korean War | 1950 | 1992 |
Republic of Korea | PR Korea | Korean War | 1950 | – |
Thailand | China | Korean War | 1951 | 1975 |
Thailand | PR Korea | Korean War | 1951 | 1975 |
Turkey | China | Korean War | 1950 | 1975 |
Turkey | PR Korea | Korean War | 1950 | 2001 |
UK | China | Korean War | 1950 | 1953 |
UK | PR Korea | Korean War | 1950 | 2000 |
USA | China | Korean War | 1950 | 1979 |
Taiwan | China | Off-shore Islands/ Taiwan Straits | 1954 | – |
India | Pakistan | Second Kashmir | 1965 | 1966 |
Laos | DR Vietnam | Second Laotian | 1968 | 1973 |
Cuba | Somalia | Second Ogaden | 1977 | 1990 |
Ethiopia | Somalia | Second Ogaden | 1977 | 1988 |
France | Egypt | Sinai War | 1956 | 1964 |
UK | Egypt | Sinai War | 1956 | 1960 |
China | DR Vietnam | Sino-Vietnamese Putative/Border War | 1979 | 1991 |
Hungary | USSR | Soviet Invasion of Hungary | 1956 | 1956 |
Turkey | Cyprus | Turco-Cypriot War | 1974 | – |
Libya | Tanzania | Ugandan-Tanzanian | 1978 | 1979 |
Uganda | Tanzania | Ugandan-Tanzanian | 1978 | 1980 |
Australia | DR Vietnam | Vietnam War | 1965 | 1973 |
Philippines | DR Vietnam | Vietnam War | 1966 | 1976 |
Republic of Korea | PR Vietnam | Vietnam War | 1965 | 1993 |
USA | DR Vietnam | Vietnam War | 1965 | 1995 |
DR Vietnam | Cambodia | Vietnam War/ Veitnamese Cambodian | 1970 | 1979 |
France | Yugoslavia | War for Kosovo | 1999 | 2000 |
Germany | Yugoslavia | War for Kosovo | 1999 | 2000 |
Italy | Yugoslavia | War for Kosovo | 1999 | 2000 |
Netherlands | Yugoslavia | War for Kosovo | 1999 | 2000 |
UK | Yugoslavia | War for Kosovo | 1999 | 2000 |
Angola | DR Congo | War over Angola | 1975 | 1978 |
Angola | South Africa | War over Angola | 1975 | 1992 |
Cuba | DR Congo | War over Angola | 1975 | 1979 |
Cuba | South Africa | War over Angola | 1975 | 1994 |
Chad | Libya | War over the Aouzou Strip | 1986 | 1988 |
Saudi Arabia | Israel | Yom Kippur War | 1973 | – |
Appendix 2
(See Table 6).
Appendix 3
Data sources and coding
Coding
The variable diplomatic rapprochement covers all countries involved in international conflict between 1945 and 2010, based on the Correlates of War Project (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). The unit of analysis in this study is dyad-year, yielding 86 dyads and 1,798 observations. Since diplomatic rapprochement requires both states to reach an agreement over mutual recognition, the dyadic approach makes the most sense.
While dyads enter the dataset when conflicts begin, duration of lack of diplomatic relations does not start until hostilities end according to Correlates of War. The duration of estrangement is from the end of hostilities until full diplomatic relations are mutually restored. In the dataset this varies from zero to 62, mean that in some instances diplomatic relations are restored as soon as or shortly after fighting ends. In all instances, diplomatic recognition was mutual and occurred at the same time.
India and Pakistan represent the sole dyad where diplomatic relations were broken and restored more than once. Therefore, the countries were treated as three separate dyads with each period between the breaking and restoration of relations counted separately.
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Bayer, Resat. 2006. “Diplomatic Exchange Data Set, v2006.1” Online: http://correlatesofwar.org
Europa World Year Book.
Statesman’s Year-Book.
In instances of ambiguity of missing information in the above sources, specific countries’ foreign ministries were consulted.
Government of Canada | |
United States State Department | |
New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs | |
Philippines Embassy in China | http://www.philembassychina.org/index.php? option = com_content&view = article&id = 8&Itemid = 6&lang = en |
Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs | |
Vietnam Embassy in Thailand | |
Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs | |
National Committee of North Korea | http://www.ncnk.org/resources/briefing-papers/all-briefing-papers/dprk-diplomatic-relations |
Greece Ministry of Foreign Affairs | https://www.mfa.gr/en/blog/greece-bilateral-relations/china/ |
Indian Embassy, Beijing | |
Afghan Embassy in Australia | |
Australian Embassy | |
United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office | https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/foreign-commonwealth-office |
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs | https://www.gov.il/en/departments/ministry_of_foreign_affairs/govil-landing-page |
France Ministry for European and Foreign Affairs | |
Armenia Ministry of Foreign Affairs | |
Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Foreign Affairs | |
Croatia Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs | |
Ethiopia Ministry of Foreign Affairs | |
El Salvador Ministry of Foreign Affairs | |
Iraq Ministry of Foreign Affairs | |
Morocco Ministry of Foreign Affairs | |
Oman Foreign Ministry | |
Saudi Arabia Ministry of Foreign Affairs | |
Syria Ministry of Foreign Affairs | |
United Arab Emirates Ministry for Foreign Affairs | |
Spain Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the European Union, and Cooperation | |
Belgium Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, and Development Commission | |
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs | https://www.government.nl/ministries/ministry-of-foreign-affairs |
Colombia Ministry of Foreign Affairs | https://www.cancilleria.gov.co/en/minister-foreign-affairs?ref=freakingnomads.com |
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Fehrs, M. Making up is hard to do: reconciliation after interstate war. Int Polit (2024). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-024-00565-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-024-00565-w