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The impact of tax-subsidized health insurance on health and out-of-pocket burden in China

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Abstract

To achieve a tiered healthcare system in China, the government has beefed up efforts to encourage people to embrace private health insurance. One of the steps is to introduce tax-subsidized health insurance (TSHI) in 2015. This paper assesses whether TSHI is successful in improving health and easing financial burden. Using unique data from the Domestic TSHI Consumers Evaluation Survey in 2019 and Propensity Score Matching method, we find that TSHI has been effective in improving participants’ health status, but not in lowering out-of-pocket (OOP) burden. Besides, TSHI can increase the utilization of both inpatient and outpatient care, which provides a possible explanation for beneficial health effect. From an internal perspective, TSHI has the potential to reduce disparities in health and access to healthcare services. Our results provide implications on modifying the benefit design of TSHI to better complement basic medical insurance system and on reforming the current tax incentive policy to reach out a large number of low-income people.

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Notes

  1. According to the released data from China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the annual average growth rate for premium is 28.54% from 2009 to 2019.

  2. In 2019, the total premiums of private health insurance in China were 706.6 billion yuan, and the population and GDP were 1.41 billion and 98.65 trillion, respectively.

  3. During 1989 and 1990, RAND Corporation conducted another randomized experiment in more than 20 villages in China, hence namely “China Rural Health Insurance Experiment,” and they reached a similar conclusion that providing health insurance could increase per capita expenditure for health care, especially outpatient expenditures (Cretin et al. 2007).

  4. More detailed description and summary can be found in “Literature Review” section.

  5. For more related studies, please refer to “Appendix 1”.

  6. Data source: National Healthcare Security Development Report 2019. Available online (in Chinese): http://www.nhsa.gov.cn/art/2020/6/24/art_7_3268.html.

  7. Data source: National Healthcare Security Development Report 2019. Available online (in Chinese): http://www.nhsa.gov.cn/art/2020/6/24/art_7_3268.html.

  8. Data source: The URRBMI financial subsidy standard is not less than 580 yuan per person per year. Available online (in Chinese): http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-06/10/content_5616558.htm.

  9. Data source: National Healthcare Security Development Report 2019. Available online (in Chinese): http://www.nhsa.gov.cn/art/2020/6/24/art_7_3268.html.

  10. In 2019, the out-of-pocket expenses accounted for 28.36% of total healthcare costs in China. Data source: National Healthcare System Development Report 2019. Available online (in Chinese): http://www.gov.cn/guoqing/2021-04/09/content_5598657.htm.

  11. Data source: Weaving a Safety Net for Public Health—Research on the Complementation of Commercial Health Insurance and Basic Medical Insurance, China Development Research Foundation, Beijing: China Development Press, 2019.

  12. For private health insurances in other countries, we choose (1) Germany: People with PHI can claim their contributions as tax-deductible expenses in the annual income tax return; (2) Brazil: Private health insurance takes a supplementary role in health coverage; tax incentives are available for those who purchase health insurance; insurers must renew contracts or provide an equivalent substitute, and cannot reject applications based on age or health status, or exclude pre-existing conditions for individual, family or non-sponsored group contracts with fewer than 50 members; (3) Egypt/India: People are encouraged to take-up private health insurance through tax subsidies, and private health insurance penetration levels are low in these two countries; (4) Canada: Both the federal government and all provincial government allow firms to deduct the cost of health benefits from employee’s taxable income.

  13. The official data for TSHI participation and policyholders’ evaluation in 2019 is not available for this study, and all information comes from the survey data. Readers with interests in official data may contact the corresponding author, and the data will be provided as soon as it becomes available.

  14. A detailed description about the change of sample sizes can be found in “Appendix 3.”

  15. The current basic medical insurance system in China consists of two main schemes, the Urban Employee Basic Medical Insurance (UEBMI), which provides medical insurance to formal-sector urban employees and retirees, and the Urban and Rural Resident Basic Medical Insurance (URRBMI), which covers unemployed urban residents, the self-employed, employees in informal sectors and rural residents. A very small percentage of the population is covered by Free Basic Medical Insurance (FBMI).

  16. We use tier-1 cities to study regional heterogeneous impact for robustness check in Sect. 7.

  17. After consulting several insurance companies and groups that offered TSHI to their employees, we have observed a so-called herd effect that some employees tend to follow others’ purchase decisions and ignore their own private information, which might also help us understand the insignificant effects of some characteristics.

  18. This could be explained by the fact that the college students learn to invest in assets that could produce long-term returns (including health), or that well-educated people have better compliance with doctor's advice.

  19. WHO (1963) lists young adulthood from 18 to 45, middle age from 45 to 59, and old age from above 60.

  20. The region information is collected from the survey question 7 which asks respondents “Which province do you currently live in?” Although Shenzhen and Guangzhou are not either province or municipality, they are both located in Guangdong province, which is the largest GDP contributor on the provincial level for the last five years (2015–2019) and considered one of the most prosperous provinces in China. Thus, if respondents are from Guangdong province, we also treat them as living in tier-1 cities.

  21. Tables for Robustness Tests and Discussion (Tables 1118) can be found in “Appendix 4.”

  22. The average OOP burden of matched non-participants in our sample is 0.2837. In the survey data, healthcare utilization, including number of outpatient visits, outpatient charges, length of stay and inpatient charges, and OOP burden are interval censored, and we only know the ordered category into which each observation falls but not the exact value of the observation. In our study, we choose the midpoint of an interval and the lower boundary of the highest interval as a proxy to calculate the average OOP burden. It is the same for healthcare utilization.

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Acknowledgements

This study was supported by “the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities” (JBK21YJ35). We thank Dr. Zhuxin Mao and Dr. Yinzhi Wang (Southwestern University of Finance and Economics) for providing helpful comments.

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Appendices

Appendix 1

Studies that estimate the impact of medical insurance on health outcomes, OOP burden, and utilization of medical care

Paper

Nation and program

Health outcomes

OOP burden

Utilization

Feldstein and Gruber (1995)

USA, “major risk policy” approach

 

A health insurance plan that has a 50% co-insurance but limits OOP spending to 10% of income can substantially reduce total medical spending

 

Keeler et al. (1988)

USA, RAND HIE

  

Cost sharing, including co-insurance and deductibles reduces use of medical services

Newhouse (1993)

USA, RAND HIE

No significant effects on a wide range of measures of health status for the average patient, except for persons with poor vision or elevated blood pressure

Health insurance without co-insurance leads to more people using services and to more services per user, referring to both outpatient and inpatient service

 

Fihn and Wicher (1988)

USA, outpatient services at the Seattle VA Medical Center

Cancelation of VA health benefits associated with increase in blood pressure

  

Perry and Rosen (2004)

USA, employer-based health insurance

No differences in self-reported health status or in the probability of a number of conditions between the self-employed and wage earners

  

Doyle (2005)

USA, private health insurance

The uninsured have a substantially higher mortality rate

 

The uninsured receive 20% less care

Lichtenberg (2002)

USA, Medicare

Increases the survival rate of the elderly

 

Increases visits to physician’s offices and utilization of ambulatory and inpatient care

Card et al. (2009)

USA, Medicare

Decreases mortality of ED admission

 

Increases number of procedures and total list charges

Finkelstein and McKnight (2008)

USA, Medicare

Medicare has no impact on overall elderly mortality in its first 10 years

Substantially reduces the elderly’s OOP risk

 

Engelhardt and Gruber (2011)

USA, Medicare

 

The extension of Medicare Part D is associated with sizeable reductions in OOP spending

 

Currie and Gruber (1996a)

USA, Medicaid

Medicaid eligibility significantly reduces children’s mortality

 

Significantly increases the utilization of medical care, particularly care delivered in physicians' offices

Currie and Gruber (1996b)

USA, Medicaid

Expanded eligibility for pregnant women lowers the incidence of infant mortality and low birth weight

  

Goldman et al. (2001)

USA, Medicaid

Health insurance can have a dramatic effect on mortality among patients with HIV

  

Currie et al (2008)

USA, Medicaid

Medicaid eligibility has little effect on children’s current health status, but eligibility in early childhood has positive effects on future health

 

Eligibility for older children improves current utilization of preventive care

Finkelstein et al. (2012)

USA, Medicaid

Extending access to Medicaid can improve self-reported physical and mental health

Medicaid lowers OOP medical expenditures and medical debt

Medicaid can induce higher healthcare utilization (including primary and preventive care as well as hospitalizations)

Baicker et al. (2013)

USA, Medicaid

The 2008 Medicaid expansion in Oregon generates no significant improvements in measured physical health outcomes in the first 2 years, but raises rates of diabetes detection and management, and lowers rates of depression

Reduces financial strain

Increases use of healthcare services

Taubman et al. (2014)

USA, Medicaid

  

The Medicaid expansion in Oregon increases overall emergency use by 0.41 visits per person, or 40% relative to an average of 1.02 visits per person in the control group

Goodman-Bacon (2018)

USA, Medicaid

Medicaid’s introduction reduces mortality rates among nonwhite infants and children in the 1960s and 1970s

  

Hanratty (1996)

Canada, National Health Insurance

Reduces infant mortality by 4% and low birth weight by 1.3%

  

Lei and Lin (2009)

China, New Cooperative Medical Scheme

No improvement in health status, measured by self-reported health status and by sickness or injury in the past 4 weeks

No reduction in OOP expenditure

Increases the utilization of preventive care, particularly general physical examinations

Chen and Jin (2012)

China, New Cooperative Medical Scheme

NCMS does not affect child morality and maternal mortality, but help improve the school enrollment of 6-year-olds

  

Wagstaff et al. (2009)

China, New Cooperative Medical Scheme

 

No reduction in overall OOP expenses, OOP expenses per outpatient visit or inpatient spell

Increases outpatient and inpatient utilization

Yip and Hsiao (2009)

China, New Cooperative Medical Scheme

 

NCMS is not effective at addressing medical impoverishment, because it overlooks spending on chronic diseases

 

Hou et al. (2014)

China, New Cooperative Medical Scheme

 

NCMS does not increase financial protection

NCMS is effective in increasing access to care

Li et al. (2014)

China, New Cooperative Medical Scheme

 

NCMS fails to prevent catastrophic health expenditure and medical impoverishment

 

Cheng et al. (2015)

China, New Cooperative Medical Scheme

NCMS improves the elderly enrollees’ activities of daily living and cognitive function, but does not lead to better self-assessed health status

There is no evidence that the NCMS has reduced their out-of-pocket spending

The elderly participants are more likely to get adequate medical services when sick

Cheung et al. (2016)

China, New Cooperative Medical Scheme

 

The NCMS induces an increase in OOP health expense for mild illness and a decrease in health payments for more serious illnesses; The NCMS also leads to a higher incidence of catastrophic healthcare spending

 

Zhou et al. (2017)

China, New Cooperative Medical Scheme

There is little evidence that NCMS expansion contributes to mortality decline

  

Pan et al. (2013)

China, Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance

URBMI has a positive effect on health

The insured do not pay more for the services

The insured receive more and better inpatient care

Liu and Zhao (2014)

China, Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance

 

URBMI does not reduce total OOP health expenses

URBMI increases the utilization of formal medical services, especially for children, low-income families and residents in the poor region

Zhang et al. (2017a, b)

China, three types of Basic Medical Insurance Schemes

  

NCMS membership is not significantly correlated with outpatient service utilization; access to three types of Basic Medical Insurance Schemes is positively related to inpatient service utilization

Zhang et al. (2017a, b)

China, three types of Basic Medical Insurance Schemes and other insurances

 

Health insurance reduces inpatient OOP expenditure; OOP spending on pharmaceuticals is reduced for inpatient care but not for outpatient care

Having health insurance increases the likelihood of utilizing healthcare

Wagstaff and Lindelow (2008)

China, three types of health insurance schemes

 

China's government and labor insurance schemes increases financial risk associated with household healthcare spending, but rural cooperative medical scheme significantly reduces financial risk in some areas but increased it in others; China's new health insurance schemes have also increased the risk of high levels of OOP spending

 

Guan and Tena (2018)

China, NCMS and URBMI

Social medical insurance schemes have no effect or even a marginally negative effect on children's health status in some cases

 

Participating in social medical insurance schemes significantly increases children's yearly hospital use, especially for children who come from rural China

Shigeoka (2014)

Japan, Elderly Health Insurance

Lower cost sharing does not improve health measures such as mortality and self-reported physical and mental health

Lower cost sharing yields reduction in OOP expenditure

Reduction in cost sharing increases healthcare utilization for both outpatient visits and inpatient admissions

Grignon et al. (2008)

France, free complementary health insurance plan

  

The plan is lack of an overall effect on utilization

Hullegie and Klein (2010)

Germany, private health insurance

Positive effects of private health insurance on health

 

Negative effects of private health insurance on the number of doctor visits, no effects on the number of nights spent in a hospital

Montoya Diaz et al. (2020)

Brazil/Egypt/India, private health insurance

 

PHI fails to address the problem of high OOP payments on health care in the three countries, because it is beyond the financial reach of those most in need of access to health care and financial protection

 

Hurley and Emmanuel Guindon (2020)

Canada, private health insurance

 

Except for drug sector, where it covers a large number of people not covered by public insurance programs, PHI contributes in only a minor way to financial protection

People with private drug insurance tend to use more publicly financed physician services

Appendix 2

Domestic TSHI Consumers Evaluation Survey Questionnaire

Part A Demographic Backgrounds

1. What is your age? ______ years old.

2. What is your gender?

A. Male B. Female

3. What is your marital status?

A.Unmarried B. Married C. Divorced D. Widowed

4. What is the highest degree or level of education you have completed?

A.Junior high school B. High school C. Bachelor's degree D. Master's degree or higher

5. Your after-tax monthly income is about ______ yuan.

6. What is your current employment status?

    A. Work in state-owned enterprises

    B. Work in public institutions

    C. Work in private enterprises

    D. Freelancers

    E. Rural migrant workers

    F. Agricultural workers

   G. Unemployed

   H. Retired

   I. Other

7. Which province do you currently live in?

    (1) Beijing (2) Tianjin (3) Hebei (4) Shanxi (5) Inner Mongolia (6) Liaoning

    (7) Jilin (8) Heilongjiang (9) Shanghai (10) Jiangsu (11) Zhejiang (12) Anhui

    (13) Fujian (14) Shandong (15) Henan (16) Hubei (17) Hunan (18) Jiangxi.

    (19) Guangdong (20) Guangxi (21) Hainan (22) Chongqing (23) Sichuan (24) Guizhou

    (25) Yunnan (26) Tibet (27) Shaanxi (28) Gansu (29) Qinghai (30) Ningxia

    (31) Xinjiang

8. What is your area of residence?

    A. Urban area B. Rural area

Part B Health Status and Medical Insurance

9. In general, how would you rate your current health status?

    A. Poor B. Average C. Good D. Very Good

10. During the last 12 months, how many times did you visit a hospital, health center or clinic for outpatient care?

      A. 0–5 times B. 6–10 times C. 11–20 times D. 21 times or more

11. What was the total cost of outpatient care for the last 12 months? (Includes out-of-pocket part and reimbursement part)

      A. 0–500 yuan B. 501–1000 yuan C. 1001–2000 yuan D. 2001–5000 yuan

      E. 5001 yuan or more

12. What was the reimbursement rate of basic medical insurance for the outpatient care?

     A. 0–10% B. 11–20% C. 21–30% D. 31–40% E. 41–50% F. 51–60% G. 61–100%

     H. 71–80% I. 81–90% J. 91–100%

13. During the last 12 months, how many days did you stay in a hospital to receive inpatient care?

     A. 0–5 days B. 6–10 days C. 11–20 days D. 21–40 days E. 41 days or more

14. What was the total medical cost for all the inpatient care you received during the last 12 months? (Includes out-of-pocket part and reimbursement part)

     A. 0–2 thousands B. 2–5 thousands C. 5–10 thousands D. 10–20 thousands

     E. 20–50 thousands F. 50–100 thousands G. 100–200 thousands H. more than 200 thousands

15. What was the reimbursement rate of basic medical insurance for the inpatient care?

     A. 0–10% B. 11–20% C. 21–30% D. 31–40% E. 41–50% F. 51–60% G. 61–100%

     H. 71–80% I. 81–90% J. 91–100%

16. What was the percentage of your out-of-pocket medical expenses (including inpatient and outpatient care) during the last 12 months to the total household expenditure?

     A. 0–20% B. 21–40% C. 41–60% D. 61–80% E. 81–100%

17. How often do you take a physical examination?

     A. Once every 6 months B. Once a year

     C. Once every 2 or 3 years D. Never took a physical examination in last 5 years

18. What is your basic medical insurance type?

      A. Free medical insurance

      B. Urban Employee Basic Medical Insurance

      C. Urban and Rural Residents Basic Medical Insurance

      D. No basic medical insurance

19. Do you think the basic medical insurance can meet your healthcare needs?

     A. Yes (Skip to q. 21) B. No (Skip to q. 20) C. Do not know (Skip to q. 21)

20. What is the main reason you think basic medical insurance cannot meet your needs?

     A. Low reimbursement rate B. Restricted benefit list C. Hard to deal with critical illness

     D. Other, please specify ______

21 . By which one of the following methods would you prefer to finance out-of-pocket medical expenses?

      A. Engage in precautionary savings B. Borrow from friends or relatives

      C. Purchase private health insurance coverage D. Other, please specify______

Part C Tax-subsidized Health Insurance

22. Do you know of Tax-subsidized health insurance, whose premium can be deducted before personal income tax, with a limit of 2400 yuan per year?

     A. Yes (Skip to q. 23) B. No (Skip to q. 24)

23. Where did you learn about TSHI?

     A. Promotional materials from insurance companies

     B. Advices from insurance brokers

     C. On TV, radio, newspapers and magazines

     D. On the Internet, social media apps like WeChat or Weibo

     E. At the workplace or community

     F. Learn from families or friends

     G. Other

24. Which of the following features of TSHI appeals to you? (Choose all that apply)

     A. Premium is tax deductible, with a limit of 2400 yuan per year.

     B. TSHI covers pre-existing diseases.

     C. Besides medical payments coverage, TSHI provides individual accounts for investment, with the settlement interest rate to be at least 2.5%.

     D. TSHI is a guaranteed renewal policy until the age of retirement.

     E. TSHI has no deductibles or waiting period.

     F. TSHI covers specified drugs, items, or medical materials not covered by basic medical insurance.

     G. None of the above.

25. Do you have TSHI?

     A. Yes (Skip to q. 26) B. No (Skip to q. 31)

26. Where did you buy TSHI?

     A. Through employers

     B. Through direct writers

     C. Through brokers or agents

     D. On the Internet, or mobile apps

     E. Through telemarketing channels

     F. Other

27. How much did you pay for TSHI?

     A. 1–200 yuan B. 200–400 yuan C. 400–700 yuan D. 700–1000 yuan E. 1000–1500 yuan

     F. 1500–2000 yuan G. 2000–3000 yuan H. 3000–4000 yuan I. 4000–5500 yuan

    J. more than 5500 yuan

28. How would you like to rate the premium of TSHI?

     A. The premium was higher than expected.

     B. The premium was appropriate.

     C. The premium was lower than expected.

     D. Do not know.

29. What was the coverage limit of your TSHI?

     A. 200 thousand yuan per year

     B. 250 thousand yuan per year

     C. 300 thousand yuan per year

     D. Other, please specify ______

30. Would you like to renew your TSHI policy?

     A. Yes B. No

31. Do you have any suggestions for the benefit design of TSHI? (Choose all that apply)

     A. Raise the tax deduction limit of 2400 yuan per year, or set no limit.

     B. Raise the coverage limit of 200–300 thousand yuan.

     C. Enlarge the list of covered drugs, items, and medical materials that are not paid by basic medical insurance.

     D. Streamline the tax deduction procedure of TSHI premium.

     E. Other, please specify ______.

Appendix 3

Change of Sample Sizes

The questionnaires were delivered across the nation with the assistance of the Insurance Association of China in August 2019, and after 2 months, 15,885 questionnaires were returned by respondents in total.

Then data cleaning was performed in the following steps. First, the observations that took less than 60 s (5% quantile) to answer the questions were dropped from the sample. Then, our dataset was restricted to respondents from age 18 to 65, as TSHI is not available for children or the elderly. We further discarded observations with missing information on key variables such as after-tax monthly income and proportion of OOP medical expenses in total household expenditure. We then excluded respondents whose after-tax monthly income was beyond the quantile (1%, 99%). Our final sample consisted of 11,939 observations.

In PSM, we employed one-to-one nearest neighbor matching within a caliper distance of 0.01 to match each participant with a non-participant. Further, observations not in the common support area were dropped from the sample in order to satisfy the common support condition. Therefore, after matching only 2744 observations were kept in the sample.

Appendix 4

See Tables 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18.

Table 11 Interval regression results for OOP burden and medical care utilization
Table 12 Impact of TSHI on health and OOP burden (using heteroskedasticity-based instruments)
Table 13 Regressions on subsamples
Table 14 Impact of TSHI on health using different matching methods
Table 15 Impact of TSHI on OOP burden using different matching methods
Table 16 Participants' willingness to renew the policy
Table 17 Health and OOP burden by renewal decision
Table 18 Impact of TSHI on health and OOP burden by renewal decision

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Yang, F., Wei, L. The impact of tax-subsidized health insurance on health and out-of-pocket burden in China. Geneva Pap Risk Insur Issues Pract 48, 194–246 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41288-022-00276-4

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